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Models in 
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Peder Veng Søberg (PhD) and Casper Høgh (MSc)
The purpose of this case book
… is to provide a more detailed and multifaceted 
view of the individual cases1, the partners, and 
the business model development processes 
than can be found in the main text of “Business 
Models in Networks: ICI Project Report.” This 
case book will capture more of the iterations 
related to business model development. The 
information outlined in the ICI Case Book has 
been collected from interviews with relevant 
people from the networks. These interviews took 
place during the year 2012. Further inquiries 
concerning the ICI project should be directed to 
professor John Johansen.2
1 Nine of a total of 10 network cases have been included in this case book. It has not been possible within the available time frame to obtain 
authorization to print the last network case.
2 Professor John Johansen, E-mail: jj@business.aau.dk , Phone: +4599408995, Center for Industrial Production, Department of Business and 
Management, Aalborg University, Fibigerstræde 10, 9220 Aalborg Ø, Denmark. 
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Summary
Whereas competitors such as AFA JCDecaux 
and Clear Channel have to plan ahead, pro-
duce, distribute, and put up posters, the Cspot 
network created a completely new medium, 
consisting of advertising monitors placed in 
shop windows using a different cost structure. 
Cspot
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Through an Internet connection, the content presented on the monitors 
could quickly be changed, thereby providing instant advertising. The 
central idea was to enable cheap, dynamic outdoor advertising targeted at 
small- and medium-sized businesses. 
The purpose of the Cspot network 
was to establish a new, instant ad-
vertising media, consisting of adver-
tisement monitors in show windows. 
In that respect, the network wanted 
to create a revolutionary new media 
that could offer low-cost advertising 
in the townscape at a price that was 
attractive even to small firms. Addi-
tionally, through a web interface, it 
should be possible for the individual 
firms to place advertisements on the 
media without having to go through 
a media agency.
Despite some very attractive charac-
teristics, especially in relation to the 
price, the case will illustrate how the 
development of the business model 
has been the cornerstone of making 
the basic idea a profitable business. 
Furthermore, the case will demon-
strate how the network actors were 
forced to reconsider many of their 
initial assumptions and concepts. At 
the same time, the case is a text-
book example of the importance of 
operationalizing the business model 
down to the organizational pro-
cesses and routines supporting the 
chosen model.
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Three entrepreneurs created the Cspot firm in the summer of 2009 as a limited 
company. Subsequently, the software supplier, JCD, and a host of other small-
sized companies also invested in the firm. Toward the end of 2009, the firm, and 
its network was accepted as an ICI network.
Introduction
The basic idea was conceived 
among the three entrepreneurs, who 
all thought that the then-current ad-
vertising media were too expensive, 
especially for SMEs. The thought 
was that it ought to be possible to 
create a cheaper media. The original 
concept was to place advertisement 
monitors in empty shop windows, 
thereby offering the landlords extra 
income while the facilities were not 
occupied. The monitors were to be 
connected to the Internet through 
3G, thus making it possible to dis-
tribute spots to the monitors without 
having to visit them physically.
The notion of using vacant shop 
windows was quickly abolished, 
in part due to problems related to 
the cleaning of the windows, along 
with the realization that the concept 
would be far more valuable if the 
monitors were placed in windows 
where there was more activity in 
general. Additionally, it was esti-
mated that there were not enough 
vacant locations for the prerequisite 
number of monitors needed in order 
to achieve critical mass.
The core of the concept was, how-
ever, that companies should be able 
to upload material and choose the 
monitors they wished to advertise 
on, thereby making the concept 
self-sustainable by minimizing the 
cost of operation. The notion of a 
self-sustainable system was highly 
motivated by an ambition to create a 
firm with practically no employees.
The case, in particular, contains 
interesting aspects on how a closely 
integrated partnership model with 
a high degree of trust and close 
relations can be essential to the 
creation of new, innovative products 
and services. Furthermore, the case 
highlights the necessity of contin-
uously reconsidering the business 
model and its profitability as new 
knowledge and insights are gained. 
Consequently, the case underlines 
the need for continuously evaluating 
and developing the business model 
with new partnerships, suppliers, 
and sales channels as the value 
proposition develops in new, unfore-
seen directions.
ICI Case Book
Cspot › Introduction
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The partners were initially found by analyzing which components were necessary 
to create the desired solution.
The partners
Cspot was the core firm of the 
network and the central driver, and 
in that respect, the manifestation of 
the collaboration between the three 
initial entrepreneurs and JCD. Even 
though Cspot was originally thought 
of as an “empty” corporation, it 
later became evident that a range 
of activities was needed in order to 
realize the business idea.
JCD acted as software supplier 
and closely integrated partner. This 
was in part due to JCD being made 
co-owner and chairman of the board 
for Cspot early on in the process, 
but was also due to the business 
model between JCD and Cspot in 
which JCD essentially created the 
software without immediate pay, 
only to sell the software to Cspot at 
a later stage.
Smeden v. Allan Ravn was origi-
nally responsible for creating stands 
and installations for the monitors 
and was, in that respect, an essen-
tial piece in the development of the 
original prototypes. At a later stage, 
this partner was made superfluous 
when the network found a cheaper 
and more effective method of install-
ing the monitors through another 
party.
Fiels og Ko was responsible for the 
graphical development of the web 
portal facing the companies utilizing 
the system. As such, the company 
contributed with competences relat-
ing to graphical layout and usability.
Blissart is specialized in delivering 
text communication and dissemina-
tion and was thereby supposed to 
help promote the Cspot solution and 
aid Cspot’s customers in setting up 
their ads.
ShowOffMedia possessed com-
petences within dynamic and visual 
advertisement, for instance, aimed 
at TV and webpages. As such, the 
company contributed important 
knowledge on how advertising was 
disseminated through a TV-based 
media.
Additionally, ATEA acted as a con-
ventional supplier of IT equipment, 
while the 3G data connections were 
purchased through different service 
providers.
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The partners
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The firm Cspot initiated its ICI process toward the end of 2009. Yet, the period 
preceding this is equally interesting, as it provides insight into how the business 
model started based on a network, the development of which is relatively unique.
The business model 
development
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development
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ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development › Network initiation
The above-mentioned components 
were largely delivered on direct 
payment. However, it is interesting 
to consider the development of the 
software platform for distributing ad-
vertising spots. Instead of acting as 
a conventional supplier, JCD chose 
to participate actively in the project 
and make the initial investment in 
the development of the software 
at no charge. In essence, this was 
only made possible by the close ties 
between JCD and the three entre-
preneurs, of which one of them soon 
after exited the collaboration.
As such, a model was created in 
which JCD carried a part of the risk 
associated with the project, prob-
ably eying a subsequent sale of a 
license payment for the platform. 
Concurrently, Fiels og Ko, Blissart, 
and ShowOffMedia were included 
in relation to the creation of various 
parts of the front-end of the system, 
whereby the network was essentially 
created, which enabled the show-
casing of the technical feasibility of 
the system.
At this point, it is important to 
highlight that at this stage, the 
concept was largely built around a 
presumption of a highly automated 
process in which small companies 
visited a website in order to upload 
their advertising, which, after a 
quick screening, was automatically 
forwarded to the correct monitors. 
As such, the core of the business 
model was heavily dependent on 
the software that was to handle 
the automated process to keep the 
underlying organization as small as 
possible. The sales channel was 
thereby limited to the web portal. 
Consequently, the model was highly 
dependent on a large number of 
small transactions from small com-
panies—a form of micro transaction.
 
Cspot started to work on the pricing 
structure to uncover the structure 
of the economic potential in the 
concept. This, in turn, also served as 
the reason for creating the firm. The 
starting point was price bracketing, 
depending on the attractiveness of 
different time periods. This pricing 
and the subsequent calculations 
showed that the advertisement 
could be produced very cheaply, 
and that each monitor displaying 
ads throughout the day could gener-
ate revenues of up to DKK 1 million 
per year. Additionally, each monitor 
would only cost around DKK 40,000 
to install and had very limited op-
erational costs—consisting only of 
the Internet connection and remu-
neration to the shop—which, in turn, 
paid for powering the monitors.
On this premise, the Cspot began 
deploying monitors, initially in Aal-
borg, as this was the natural base of 
the Cspot.  As such, the Cspot had 
already deployed 15–20 monitors 
when it became involved in the ICI 
project as an ICI network, and the IT 
infrastructure for submitting and dis-
tributing spots was already in place. 
As such, the challenge was to create 
the necessary revenue needed to 
carry the firm Cspot forward.
Network 
initiation
As described earlier, the idea was formed among three entrepreneurs situated in 
the same building. Through a dialogue amongst themselves, they were able to 
discern which competences were presumed to be necessary to create the system. 
Specifically, it was deduced that there was a need for a stand for the monitors. 
Therefore, Smeden v. Allan Ravn from the same building was included. For the 
electronic equipment, ATEA was found as a traditional supplier.
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Originally, the Cspot network had 
assumed that the customers would 
rapidly accept the concept; thus, the 
critical mass of customers would be 
achieved relatively quickly. This pre-
sumption turned out to be flawed, 
which made the Cspot network 
realize the need for additional sales 
activities. At this point, the Cspot 
network was strongly engaged in 
investing in additional monitors in 
all larger cities because they did not 
wish to invest too heavily in internal 
sales competences. The conclusion 
was to use a sales company that 
would be paid based on sales only. 
Thereby, Cspot avoided investing 
further in personnel, and in that 
manner, transferred some of the risk 
to the sales company, for which they 
would receive 50% of all sales they 
made. However, this entailed a se-
ries of consequences, as the type of 
organization involved typically had a 
large turnover rate of sales person-
nel, and severe issues in creating 
common and consistent messages 
for customers. 
As a consequence, Cspot hired a 
marketing manager. The task was 
to create the correct messages for 
the customers, thereby ensuring 
consistency for customers. Concur-
rently, the firm initiated a process 
aimed at optimizing the entire sales 
process. This initially emphasized 
retaining the sales personnel in the 
sales company to ensure more ex-
perienced sellers were in place who 
knew the concept thoroughly. In ad-
dition, an analysis of the post-sales 
processes was undertaken to ensure 
that the transition from the sales 
company to Cspot went as smoothly 
as possible. A structured after-sales 
process had been missing.
The entire sales effort remained 
quite heavy when balanced against 
the comparatively small business 
customers with equivalently small 
advertising budgets, and the firm 
was aware of this from the start. 
However, the firm expected the 
concept to have the profitability 
necessary to carry it forward, and 
counted on the sales effort tailing off 
as a critical mass was attained. This 
led to an explicit ambition to secure 
larger clients in which the sales 
effort was better aligned with the 
customers’ budgets.
Sales
As mentioned, the premise was that Cspot’s customers were to utilize the website 
for uploading their advertising spots. However, from inception, there was an 
understanding that some sales effort would be necessary to attain a critical mass 
of customers, which was also needed to attain a critical mass of installed monitors 
(addressed later). As a consequence, a CEO was employed in 2010. The CEO was 
made responsible for driving the monitor deployment and sales.
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development › Sales
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The immediate assumption made 
by Cspot was that the problem 
lay in the software available to the 
customers, which led to the devel-
opment of a website module for 
designing and producing advertising 
spots. The other issue was that, in 
general, the customers did not pos-
sess the necessary understanding of 
how to build a spot and communi-
cate specific messages. This meant 
that the spots created by the cus-
tomers were often of poor quality, 
which, in essence, served to reduce 
the overall attractiveness and value 
of Cspot to other advertisers, which 
was especially critical in relation to 
the larger companies.
In the same vein, the customers did 
not have the necessary insight into 
which monitors were most relevant 
for their advertisements. This should 
be seen in relation to Cspot’s lack of 
consideration regarding this issue, 
which was further demonstrated by 
the sometimes-random placement 
of monitors.
Therefore, Cspot ought to have 
reconsidered its business model 
as the basic idea of direct sales 
to small companies gradually lost 
its attractiveness. The conclusion 
was that Cspot, to a greater extent, 
needed to consider itself as being 
in line with other media, such as 
newspapers and TV advertisements. 
In this respect, most advertisement 
budgets went through media agen-
cies who handled their customer’s 
marketing budgets aimed at differ-
ent media. Cspot therefore began 
seeking out the media agencies. The 
large advertisers did not want to talk 
with Cspot before they could offer 
something countrywide. Hence, 
Cspot invested heavily in order to 
become able to deliver commercials 
countrywide. The large advertisers 
also wanted documentation of the 
effect and the number of people 
who view the screens. Thus, a great-
er understanding of the media itself 
was needed. 
The customers
Simultaneous to the sales effort, research revealed that the customers were mainly 
relatively small business customers. The basic problem was that customers did 
not possess the necessary competences needed to create advertising spots.
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development › The customers
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A part of the collaboration with ICI 
specifically pertained to analyzing 
the media’s visibility and effect, 
which eventually became the OTS 
numbers. Yet, the firm did not wish 
to make the necessary investment 
early on in the process. In part, this 
was due to how the analysis was 
to be carried out methodically, but 
it was also related to the presumed 
need to have the analysis undertak-
en by a recognized analytic agency, 
for example, Gallup. This meant that 
the analysis would become relatively 
expensive, which was beyond the 
firm’s investment scope. Addition-
ally, the original vision was still too 
deeply anchored in the firm for it to 
take a strategic gamble in another 
direction, as the firm still focused on 
maintaining the existing business 
model. ICI also facilitated contact 
with BLIP Systems (described later 
in relation to the Mobile Tracking 
network). BLIP was willing to use its 
technology to provide Cspot with 
the effect validation needed. Howev-
er, Cspot did not want BLIP to do it. 
As mentioned earlier, there was 
also a lack of understanding of the 
influence the location of the moni-
tors had on the value of the concept. 
Consequently, in collaboration with 
ICI, it was found to be necessary to 
define good screen locations and 
plan to remove the worst place-
ments, as these only served to 
diminish the concept’s value. These 
poor placements can mainly be 
attributed to the strong emphasis 
that was placed early on in the proj-
ect on creating a large install base. 
Additionally, it was also necessary to 
create a clearer segmentation of the 
individual monitors for the customer 
to create a sound understanding 
about which locations had the most 
value for specific customers and 
even for specific messages.
In that respect, a thorough under-
standing of the Cspot media was 
also missing. This relates to the 
graphical instruments utilized in the 
Cspot media, similar to how differ-
ent instruments are utilized in TV 
and radio commercials. As such, 
the emphasis should have been on 
uncovering the graphical and com-
municative profile most suited to the 
concept. Yet, the firm never created 
this understanding, which should 
also be seen as the background for 
why it did not specify the types of 
messages best suited for the con-
cept. This did, however, lead to the 
decision to attract a media partner, 
who was to specialize in delivering 
spots for the Cspot solution as a 
means of providing an extra service 
to the customers.
However, this still did not create 
legitimacy in the media agencies’ 
eyes, as they also needed to know 
how the concept would fit into a 
general marketing strategy. To a 
greater extent, this issue also ap-
plied to small companies, as they 
had an even more explicit need for 
advice regarding which monitor lo-
cation would convey their messages 
in the most feasible manner.
Media understanding
The need for a better understanding of the media was already apparent in 
the middle of 2011, and at the time, this was focused mainly on the so-called 
opportunity to see (OTS) numbers. At this point, however, the firm did not manage 
to realign its vision. Consequently, the internal emphasis remained on direct sales 
to small customers. 
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development › Media understanding
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Subsequently, the firm was forced 
to search for a potential buyer. The 
search was largely targeted toward 
finding a buyer with existing exper-
tise within the area, which directed 
the focus to advertising agencies 
and existing media. This made it ap-
parent that the value of the concept 
was largely within the installed mon-
itors. Thus, the focus was renewed 
on documenting how many people 
would typically go by each monitor, 
and how many of these would es-
sentially notice the messages being 
broadcast. These efforts aimed at 
making the concept attractive to 
potential buyers.
The search for a buyer was ultimate-
ly unsuccessful, which led JCD to 
take ownership of the operational 
monitors, while Cspot went into 
bankruptcy toward the end of 2012.
The resources
The above factors collectively led to Cspot running out of financial resources in 
the middle of 2012 due to a lack of revenue from the operations, in addition to the 
owner not wanting to invest further in the endeavor, as it had still not proved to be 
profitable.
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development › The resources
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This realization should have influ-
enced the firm far earlier to create a 
business model more reminiscent of 
other media firms. As such, a part-
nership with a media agency should 
have been pursued more vigorously 
to understand the Cspot media bet-
ter and create the necessary data for 
the use thereof.
Accordingly, the investment in mon-
itors across the entire country could 
have been limited to initially encom-
passing Aalborg, thereby creating a 
test bed to build experiences in us-
ing the media. The customers were 
interested in the concept, but unable 
to deliver their own needed content. 
The large advertisers were also inter-
ested in the concept, however the 
price was too low, and since they 
get paid in terms of a percentage of 
their customers advertising engage-
ments, they had little interest in the 
making Cspot a success.
Part of the explanation for the de-
velopment is probably nested in the 
founders’ desire to create a quick 
return on investment, or at least to 
create a business that would be 
sustainable without further invest-
ment, which courting the advertising 
agencies would have implied. Per-
haps things would have gone better 
had more resources been invested 
in proving the concept and its effect. 
Another question concerns what 
influence the close integration with 
JCD had on the development, as 
JCD had a vested interest in keeping 
the software system at the core of 
the firm, as JCD later created a reve-
nue stream out of supporting and 
servicing the software. 
In retrospect
The central issue for the firm was that the proposed business model did not turn 
out to be feasible, as the customers who were originally envisioned did not have 
the prerequisites for creating and buying advertising on the system. 
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development › In retrospect
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Subsequently, these were made 
mostly irrelevant. This was evi-
denced with Smeden v. Allan Ravn, 
where Cspot found a significantly 
cheaper supplier that also had a 
product that was significantly easier 
to scale up into larger numbers, 
whereas the original solution was 
custom made. Alternative partners 
had been turned into suppliers, as 
in the case of JCD, which created a 
business area by participating in the 
network.
It is, however, interesting to note 
how the network approach contin-
ued after the technical challeng-
es were overcome. For example, 
collaboration with TV2 News was 
initiated, whereby Cspot attained 
important content for the monitors, 
thus creating greater relevance for 
the concept, in which TV2 News 
was ensured further exposure in set-
tings in which they did not normally 
operate. Similarly, Cspot found a 
company to handle the sales, which 
removed some pressure from the 
Cspot organization.
Partner development
With the exception of the collaboration with JCD, Cspot represents a classic 
company startup in a network where a central firm took control and subsequently 
gathered the necessary competences around the firm. The original partners mainly 
thought in terms of the competences needed to create the technical solution, 
which they did accomplish. 
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model development › Partner development
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Summary
The network Energirigtigt og Bæredygtigt 
Byggeri (EBB) was created to develop a busi-
ness model in relation to an ongoing innova-
tion effort. This effort focused on development 
of energy-efficient and sustainable insulation 
encapsulated in concrete for use in building 
construction. 
EBB
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Hence, ICI was not involved in the 
product development, but focused 
on the development of the business 
model. The idea was to develop the 
business model in parallel with the 
final steps of the product develop-
ment. Hence, this case description 
includes aspects of the ongoing 
product development process, even 
though the role of ICI was to focus 
on the development of the business 
model, whereas the companies 
involved carried out the product 
development.   The case highlights 
challenges of carrying out product 
development and business model 
creation in parallel. The industrial 
potential of the underlying concept 
seems strong. For instance, sup-
port has been secured from the 
Advanced Technology Foundation 
(Højteknologifonden).
EBB is a Danish abbreviation for environmentally friendly and sustainable 
construction. The companies involved turned to ICI for help on how to 
develop the related business model.
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/20
The foundation for the network was laid when Gabriel, one of the core firms, 
won the Innovation Cup in 2007. Subsequently, a rich dialogue was initiated with 
Hi-con concerning innovation, business models, and general idea exchange. Yet, 
the dialogue remained quite vague, as it did not contain any actual product ideas.
Introduction
A small breakthrough happened 
when Gabriel developed a prod-
uct concept that utilized recycled 
materials to provide soundproofing 
for buildings. This led to the forming 
the basic idea of combining textiles 
and concrete in order to create new, 
innovative products.
The concept developed even further 
as an idea emerged concerning 
creating a heat-insulating solution 
made of recycled textiles that could 
be integrated into Hi-con’s building 
elements, thereby creating exciting 
alternatives to the existing solutions 
on the market by offering a product 
with a greener profile and potentially 
better characteristics. This formed 
the basis for creating the EBB net-
work with the purpose to develop a 
business model this product.
ICI Case Book
EBB › Introduction
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The partners
Gabriel is specialized within de-
velopment, production, and sales 
of upholstery fabric and related 
textiles. As such, the company 
possesses competences within 
textile behavior, and was therefore 
an obvious collaboration partner for 
the development of an insulation 
concept based on recycled textiles.
Hi-con is specialized in the manu-
facturing of elements in high-per-
formance concrete, with a special 
focus on stairs and balconies. 
Thereby, Hi-con represented com-
petences which could aid in trans-
forming the insulation concept into 
actual finished products. Addi-
tionally, Hi-con was thought of as 
the sales channel and face of the 
finished products.
Densit produces high-performance 
concrete mortar and collaborat-
ed with Hi-con, as Hi-con utilized 
Densit as one of their main suppli-
ers. Densit was therefore an obvious 
partner, as it could provide further 
competences within concrete cast-
ing and create additional revenue 
through Hi-con.
Formfiber possessed technology 
and knowledge relating to the pro-
duction of non-woven textiles, along 
with a range of patents associated 
with production methods thereof. 
As such, the company was a central 
supplier of technology for the origi-
nal idea. The company discontinued 
its involvement in the ICI network 
after the initial workshops, but 
continued to take part in the product 
development until the initial tests 
showed that the technology could 
not contribute as expected.
Arkitektfirmaet C.F. Møller has 
extensive competences within the 
design of buildings and building 
components, with great knowledge 
of end-customer needs, which was 
important in relation to the final 
design of the concept. Additionally, 
the company had previously worked 
specifically on energy-efficient 
construction and could thereby 
contribute with that knowledge. Yet, 
it withdrew from the network at an 
early stage, as the business model 
was not aligned with its own.
Adapa Adapa possesses compe-
tences within development and 
manufacturing of curved concrete 
elements. Adapa was not added to 
the network until later in the pro-
cess, as the focus shifted to being 
able to deliver visually exciting 
concrete products; namely, in col-
laboration with Hi-con. As such, the 
company could contribute with its 
unique knowledge of creating com-
ponents in special shapes. This did, 
however, not change the concept as 
such.
ICI Case Book
EBB › The partners
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With the starting point as creating insulation with recycled materials, the network 
began a range of activities in different directions with the same overall 
purpose. In addition, it was part of the value proposition that extra insulation could 
be added to buildings without adding much extra wall thickness. 
The development of the 
business model 
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model’s development
One of the early realizations was 
that there were already others work-
ing on similar technologies, through 
which contact was made to another 
actor in possession of a patent on 
an interesting technology, which, 
according to early testing, was more 
effective than existing solutions.
Accordingly, the starting point of the 
collaboration was an assumption 
that the technologies were already 
available and that the challenges 
were mainly related to creating the 
right business models and areas of 
responsibility, along with creating 
the necessary interfaces between 
the partners.
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One of the first tasks for the network 
consisted of defining and delineating 
the market to uncover the market 
potential. For this, it was largely 
Hi-con’s existing knowledge that 
was brought into play. Through the 
process, a range of potentials within 
different applications was identi-
fied, which ended with the network 
focusing on energy renovation. This 
was chosen because the network 
considered this as the largest and 
most accessible application area, 
as well as a good fit for Hi-con. This 
was due to energy renovations often 
consisting of placing a shell outside 
an existing building, which weighed 
heavily on the existing foundation. 
As such, Hi-con’s solutions were 
particularly interesting, as they 
could produce a lighter shell through 
their high-performance concrete. 
Additionally, the network carefully 
estimated that the market potential 
for energy renovation in single-fam-
ily housing and store buildings was 
around DKK 8 billion for the finished 
installation. This was naturally the 
total figure, which also included the 
costs associated with installation 
and the like.
The calculations were not particu-
larly advanced, but still proved that 
there was a large potential. Addi-
tionally, the network was aware that 
a new building regulation was being 
drawn up for 2020, which would 
place even greater demands on the 
energy effectiveness and sustain-
ability of buildings. 
As part of the considerations 
regarding the market, the network 
also paid special attention to the 
possibility of entering the market 
for new constructions, but this was 
abandoned as a possible short-term 
strategy because the market for new 
constructions is very small, and this 
market more or less disappeared 
during the financial crisis. Therefore 
it is more interesting to target the 
market for renovation.
The goal of the project in terms of 
product has always been a building 
element. The insulating material is 
only a partial component. It is far 
more interesting in terms of business 
model that Hi-con constitutes the 
way to the market. They have during 
the project evolved significantly. 
The delay in the development of the 
insulation material did not hinder 
that Hi-con developed its business 
model. They are already supplying to 
the market for insulation of existing 
buildings. Even without insulation 
material from Gabriel. This develop-
ment is one of the driving forces of 
cooperation between Gabriel and 
Hi-con today.
The market
The starting point for the initiation of the network was a presumption that the 
material it could produce would be able to insulate up to 40% better than material 
with the same insulation thickness. This presumption was later challenged 
significantly, but was still essential in initiating the process.
ICI Case Book
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Hi-con was also to work as the sales 
channel for the concept. Gabriel was 
to build competence and under-
standing of insulation in general, 
aimed at later building competences 
within the production of the insu-
lation product in collaboration with 
Formfiber, potentially through an 
acquisition. In that respect, a test 
production process was quickly 
established. Last, C.F. Møller was 
to contribute knowledge regarding 
how the final product should be 
configurable based on its existing 
knowledge of architecture, design, 
and energy renovation.
Competence areas
The network established a basic distribution of responsibilities in which Hi-con 
focused on its competences within the casting of concrete elements in close 
collaboration with Densit.
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model’s development › Competence areas
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/25
In that respect, it became clear that 
many of these factors could not only 
be prescribed to single components 
of the product, but would depend on 
the finished product, in which insu-
lation and concrete was combined 
and installed in a building. Through 
this revelation, it became clear that 
the network did not yet understand 
how this interrelation would function. 
In other words, it was necessary to 
create the necessary architectures 
to facilitate communication between 
the partners.
Thus, there was a need to create 
a common understanding of how 
the finished product would behave, 
aimed at uncovering how to fasten 
the finished elements onto the build-
ings, and what the elements—com-
prised of concrete and insulation—
should be composed of, and how 
this would relate to them fastening 
onto the building, along with which 
different product shapes would be 
required. The network initiated a 
prototyping process where energy 
renovation was carried out on one of 
Gabriel’s buildings. Also, a small-
scale house was constructed using 
the concept.
Primarily, this led the network to 
investigate whether it was possi-
ble to actually produce an element 
consisting of insulation encapsu-
lated in concrete. Originally, this 
task was intended for Hi-con, but 
it could not complete the task due 
to it being heavily occupied with 
operational tasks, which led Densit 
to take on the task, as it viewed this 
as a potential method of expanding 
Hi-con’s business area, and thus, its 
own. Accordingly, a simple proto-
type was created, acting as proof-
of-concept, and showing that it was 
possible to encapsulate the insula-
tion in concrete. 
However, problems arose during the 
collaboration with C.F. Møller, which 
chose to exit the network relatively 
early on in the process. The project 
deviated too much from the compa-
ny’s existing business model.
Consequently, the network was 
faced with the issue that it lacked 
the competences for the utilization 
of the elements, which made it diffi-
cult to define which characteristics 
the product should have.
Interfaces
Based on the competence areas uncovered by the network, it became evident 
that the product had to fulfill a range of regulatory demands in the form of different 
conformities and demands, for example, demands on its flame-retardant effect.
ICI Case Book
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Through a series of tests, it became 
evident that the insulation concept 
at hand did not have the poten-
tial that the network had originally 
thought that it would have; namely, 
its potential in terms of the insulation 
value. This meant that the product 
went from having been potentially 
superior to existing solutions, to, in 
reality, being inferior from an insula-
tion perspective. This meant that it 
would require a thicker layer of the 
new insulation material to achieve 
the same insulation effect as exist-
ing solutions.
The key sales parameter was there-
fore abolished, yet there were still 
other potential parameters, as the 
concept maintained its green profile 
through the use of recycled mate-
rials, and a manufacturing process 
that did not require nearly as much 
energy as traditional solutions.
However, a range of other issues 
arose, which also aided in the 
dismissal of the concept. Namely, 
fire safety would be an issue due to 
the use of recycled textiles, which 
are generally quite flammable. To 
achieve the required flame-retardant 
effect, it would be necessary to uti-
lize a series of chemicals, which was 
not possible due to the European 
legislation within the area. Addition-
ally, the market for alternative insula-
tions was already relatively crowded, 
consisting of a series of actors with 
different concepts but with similar 
sales parameters.
These factors led to discarding the 
entire concept. Nevertheless, Ga-
briel and Hi-con they continued to 
work together. 
The real potential 
of the product
Through Gabriel’s work on building competences within insulation, it became 
increasingly clear what constituted good insulation; i.e., an emphasis was placed 
on insulation value (lambda value) but also on a range of other factors.
ICI Case Book
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Consequently, the existing solutions 
on the market would most likely not 
be able to fulfill the new demands, 
combined with the demands for 
aesthetics, as the new regulation 
would require significantly thicker 
walls in order to house more insu-
lation material. This also meant that 
an even greater market for insulation 
renovation revealed itself, as existing 
buildings would have to be insulated 
to remain up-to-date.
The 2020 building 
regulative 
Concurrent with the testing of the original idea, the building regulation for 2020 
was finished in August 2010. This placed increasing demands on building, 
especially on the insulation ability of new buildings. 
ICI Case Book
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Accordingly, the demands involved 
finding an insulation material that 
could provide a high insulation value 
with a thin layer of insulation at a 
reasonable price.
In that respect, Gabriel believes it 
has found such a material, which, 
in a unique combination with other 
technologies, can fulfill the criteria. 
Accordingly, Gabriel has applied for 
a patent for the insulation concept. 
The details of the concept are still 
strictly classified due to the huge 
commercial potential, which is why 
the details of the product and the 
associated technical challenges 
have been withheld. However, it is 
still interesting to observe how the 
network has since evolved in its 
configuration and in the logic behind 
the configuration.
Formfiber withdrew from the net-
work, as its technology was not 
relevant for the new technology. 
Yet the four remaining partners still 
participate in the network.
While previously the emphasis was 
on ensuring coherence amongst 
the architectures, the network 
realized that it needed to separate 
the architectures to build compe-
tences within the respective fields 
to assemble the architectures into a 
finished product at a later stage. As 
such, a far-sighted business model 
for the development of the con-
cept has emerged, which entails an 
ongoing dialogue and the develop-
ment of collaboration. The following 
describes how the distribution of 
labor is structured.
New insulation 
concept
Following the discarding of the original concept, and combined with the 
knowledge of the 2020 building regulation, Gabriel began an intensive search 
for alternative technologies that could fulfill the demands of the regulation while 
conserving the aesthetic qualities. 
ICI Case Book
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Gabriel also collaborates with the 
Institute of Nano-technology at Aal-
borg University. As such, Gabriel has 
assumed the role of coordinating a 
network that does not directly en-
gage with the Hi-con collaboration. 
Accordingly, Gabriel ties the concept 
together.
In that respect, Gabriel will not 
necessarily become the producer of 
the material, but rather, it will create 
value, in part through the patenting 
of the product, combined with the 
company’s intricate knowledge of 
the properties of the product, and 
how this product can be combined 
with other elements should it be-
come ready for production. Gabriel 
thus emphasizes not merely becom-
ing a component supplier, but also 
its participation as a development 
partner, initially with Hi-con, but 
probably with a host of actors in the 
long run. 
Gabriel
Gabriel is responsible for developing the insulation material by utilizing the 
technical knowledge accumulated along with the knowledge it received from 
Hi-con on the demands placed on the insulation. In that respect, Gabriel has 
identified a range of partners around the development of the new insulation 
concept, of which one was quickly displaced due to a lack of trust. 
ICI Case Book
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The development of manufacturing 
knowledge for concrete is carried 
out in close collaboration with 
Densit. Additionally, a dialogue is 
maintained with Gabriel, through 
which Hi-con feeds knowledge back 
to Gabriel on its requirements for the 
finished product. As such, Hi-con 
has come up with a method through 
which, even if the insulation concept 
fails, the company will still have built 
a new business area involving ele-
ments for the insulation of existing 
buildings with other partners. Addi-
tionally, the close ties with Gabriel 
means that if the insulation concept 
materializes, Hi-con will have great 
pre-knowledge and early access to 
a potentially revolutionary product.
The lack of an architect in the 
network has meant that Hi-con 
has chosen to emphasize building 
the necessary knowledge on insu-
lation-element fastening, but the 
company is still working on finding a 
partner who can provide knowledge 
within this area. 
Hi-con/Densit
Hi-con is carrying out the concurrent development of encapsulated insulation 
units, through which the company is building its experience of combining 
insulation and concrete in general, and of how these elements must be 
configurable for installation in buildings.
ICI Case Book
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Adapa
Adapa is continually working with Hi-con to create new knowledge regarding the 
possibilities of utilizing concrete to make use of this knowledge in the long term 
in combination with the insulation concept. This is probably far into the future, but 
the collaboration between Adapa and Hi-con is still ongoing.
ICI Case Book
Cspot › The business model’s developmentt › Adapa
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Summing up
In the EBB network, there were initially as-
pects of a network-based business model. How-
ever, Hi-con was chosen as the core company, 
because they already have market access. 
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Summary
The Eye In the Sky network was created with 
the purpose of developing an unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) for non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) to use in crisis areas. 
Eye In the Sky
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The network is especially interesting due to the specific 
development it has undergone, as it started as a single 
product for a handful of specific applications, but later 
developed a far greater potential, which could only be 
realized by extending the network-based business mod-
el even further. 
The case contains interesting insights into how the original cooperative-
network concept was abandoned in favor of a more central control over the 
product and business, thereby demonstrating a host of issues arising when 
attempting to assemble competences around a particular product idea.
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The Eye in the Sky network was initiated as part of Access2Innovation (A2I), 
run by Ph.D. Jacob Ravn. The platform’s purpose was to bring together NGOs, 
universities, and private companies in a triple-helix construction to come up with 
new, innovative solutions for the work done by relief organizations in third world 
countries.
Introduction
The A2I project, for what would 
become the Eye In the Sky network, 
was initiated in spring 2008, taking 
its point of departure in a close col-
laboration with DanChurchAid’s hu-
manitarian mine action (HMA) group. 
The HMA had become the area of 
focus for the project, as it was one 
of the groups within DanChurchAid 
that carried out tasks themselves, 
which could thereby provide a better 
understanding of the work being 
done.
The starting point of the dialogue 
was a project conceived at Aalborg 
University (AAU) concerning an 
autonomous mine-seeking helicop-
ter, which was, however, quickly 
rejected by the HMA, as the areas 
they operated in were often heav-
ily overgrown. Yet, they had good 
experiences using over-flight images 
for identifying potential mine areas 
based on different characteristics. 
The issue was that these images 
were rarely available. Coupling this 
with the idea of a flying mine-seek-
er spawned the idea of creating a 
small, robust unmanned helicopter 
with an inbuilt camera, which could 
create the necessary picture material 
in the field. The network around A2I 
was thereby essential in the creation 
of the original idea.
ICI Case Book
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Throughout the process, some partners have left, and new ones have joined 
as the network transitioned from A2I to the ICI project, when Sky-Watch 
was created as an independent firm toward the end of 2009. The network’s 
composition was to a large extent influenced by a desire to gather the 
competences necessary for manufacturing the helicopter solution, consisting 
of a frame, wireless communication for control and data-communication, user 
interface, and competences pertaining to the handling of images.
The partners
Sky-Watch was founded in 2009 
as a direct descendant of the A2I 
project and became the core firm of 
the network project.
Enviclean created the first proto-
type and subsequently became the 
primary investor in the newly found-
ed Sky-Watch and Enviclean’s CEO 
(the investor) assumed the role of 
chairman of the board at Sky-Watch.
Mekan contributed with mechan-
ical competences, essential to the 
manufacturing of the first prototype 
in collaboration with Enviclean. They 
were later made superfluous as 
other production methods came to 
be utilized. Mekan is also part-owner 
of Sky-Watch.
DanChurchAid was, as mentioned, 
representative of the potential cus-
tomers and the user of the original 
product. Through that, they had a 
large influence on the development 
and the demand specifications as-
sociated with the product.
Danish Aerotech worked with the 
manufacturing of mechanical, struc-
tural, and electrical components for 
airplanes and the design of these. 
Additionally, they worked with air-
plane and helicopter maintenance, 
where especially the mechanical 
knowledge and the maintenance 
of flying units had relevance to the 
project.
GomSpace worked on components 
for satellites and the control there-
of, through which collaboration on 
power supplies emerged.
NetImage worked with delivering 
web-based solutions within e-trade, 
e-services, and digital billing, and 
therefore had competences within 
data control and structure, along 
with competences within the con-
struction of user interfaces to be uti-
lized in the control of the helicopter.
SpaceCom worked with products 
within satellite communication 
and radio connections, which was 
paramount for the communication 
between the control unit and the 
helicopter, controlling the geo-refer-
encing of the picture material. How-
ever, the company did not remain 
a network partner once Sky-Watch 
was created.
InnovationHub was founded by 
Jacob Ravn in relation to the A2I 
project to drive the early network 
development by uncovering the 
needs and wants of the target mar-
ket and the market potential. When 
Sky-Watch was founded, Innova-
tionHub was no longer needed as 
the driver.
Furthermore, the Department for 
Automation and Control at AAU 
was involved, as they possessed 
internationally leading knowledge on 
the control of autonomous helicop-
ters and airplanes, thus acting as a 
central piece to the start-up of the 
network. They did not, however, 
continue as a partner after Sky-
Watch was founded.
ICI Case Book
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The following depicts the entire network development spanning both the A2I 
and ICI projects. This is because A2I preceded the ICI project, but still contains 
important insights on how network-based business models are developed.
The business model’s 
development
ICI Case Book
Eye In the Sky › The business model’s development
Additionally, ICI was partially in-
volved in the A2I project. Further-
more, part of the motivation of the 
firms in participating came from the 
funding presented by ICI.
The development of the network 
demonstrates how different partners 
are involved at different stages in the 
process and how the development 
of the product was enabled by the 
use of a network-based approach.
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For the time being, the network set 
up a rudimentary business model, 
largely based on acquiring public 
funds through the ICI, which at the 
time had presented the network with 
the possibility of significant fund-
ing. At the time, the structure of the 
organization, distribution, revenue, 
and costs were not laid out, as the 
emphasis was on uncovering the 
need that the network sought to 
fulfill.
The consequence of the lack of 
clarity in the business model with-
in the network was eventually that 
none of the partners wanted to take 
responsibility for uncovering whether 
the project had real potential. Thus, 
the A2I leader, Jacob Ravn, chose 
to set up InnovationHub to take 
over the project leader role tempo-
rarily. Through Jacob Ravn’s work, 
exact demand specifications (listed 
below) were developed, which could 
be processed further. Furthermore, 
a conducted analysis showed a 
market potential within humanitarian 
mine clearing estimated at roughly 
US$ 20 million.
- The system’s primary focus was 
to create over-flight images of the 
landscape at a quality that would 
enable planning the work on-site
- The system was to be easy to 
operate for a person after a short 
introduction to the system
- The system was to deliver a high 
degree of stability and robust-
ness
In that respect, the challenge of 
uncovering the market had been 
cleared, yet a technical challenge 
remained in ensuring that a proto-
type was made to prove whether it 
was technically possible to bring in 
the competences of the network in 
a product that could fulfill market 
demands. The plan was to exploit 
the competences in the network and 
buy components from other manu-
facturers when necessary.
The Access2Innovation 
process
The project was initially conceived as a network project in which the partners 
would provide their unique knowledge and competences in relation to the creation 
of the desired solution. 
ICI Case Book
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Furthermore, another motivation 
was that the financial crisis had 
started kicking in, and all of the 
involved companies were experienc-
ing tougher times due to a downturn 
in the business cycle. This added 
to the interest for the project and 
the expectation of getting develop-
ment activities fully funded by ICI 
was welcomed. This led to the start 
of the development of a prototype 
of the UAV, and during this work, it 
became clear that to lift the project, 
each and every party would have to 
commit funding too. The project was 
left in a critical state because the 
partners started losing interest in it, 
due to the capital requirements. 
None of the partners wanted to 
take responsibility for this part, as 
it represented a risk factor to invest 
the necessary hours in developing 
a product. This was, in part, due to 
the technical uncertainty along with 
uncertainties on how the potential 
future economic gains were to be 
distributed.
After a standstill, an employee from 
SpaceCom started raising money for 
the project individually. As the proj-
ect was in a seed phase, only a few 
funding opportunities were available. 
However, the SpaceCom employ-
ee managed to convince his father 
to invest and, at the same time, 
involved a local business incubator 
(NOVI) as a source of syndicated 
funding. This led to the registration 
of a separate company, Sky-Watch 
A/S. The partners were still relevant 
to the project of developing a drone 
helicopter, but only one of them was 
willing to invest money in the proj-
ect. Therefore, the network making 
up the business model changed 
from the pure network model to a 
situation where Sky-Watch would be 
the driving force.
The first prototype
The five network companies all had a natural interest in the project because their 
individual contributions were similar to what they were doing in their existing 
businesses, and at the same time, the project did not compete with their existing 
markets. 
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The project proved hard to sell to 
potential suppliers due to the way 
publicly funded projects operate. 
This entails a relatively long time-
span from invoice to final payment, 
which hampered the procurement of 
parts and other services. As such, 
the project was close to grinding to 
a halt, despite NOVI, in the spring 
of 2009, providing a letter of intent 
stating that they were prepared to 
inject a loan into the project if anoth-
er investor were to provide a similar 
amount.
This was when the project man-
ager from Spacecom, Jonas Jo-
hansen, realized that the project 
would never develop unless a firm 
took ownership and controlled the 
development. Furthermore, he also 
saw great possibilities within other 
segments beyond the NGOs, which 
further increased the commercial 
potential of the project significantly.
At this time, the project was referred 
to as the IKT (information and com-
munications technology) project, 
which also contained aspects that 
would later become the ICI network 
ViewWorld. Yet, the condition for 
initiating the project as a company 
was to focus solely on the helicopter 
solution.
Partially aided by the letter of intent 
from NOVI, the instigator, Jonas 
Johansen, tried to borrow the nec-
essary funds from a bank to start 
up the company but was, ultimate-
ly, rejected. Subsequently, Jonas 
Johansen contacted his father, the 
owner of Enviclean, inquiring about 
a personal loan for funding the 
creation of the company. Up until 
this point, Enviclean had not been 
officially involved in the project, but 
was informed about the project and 
its contents.
In the summer of 2009, Enviclean 
participated in one of the meet-
ings to assess the potential of the 
project. By the end of the meeting, 
Enviclean offered, in collaboration 
with Mekan, to create a prototype 
of proof-of-concept to demonstrate 
that the concept was viable. This 
was demonstrated later the same 
year. This only demonstrated a heli-
copter with a camera mounted on it 
that was manually controlled, but it 
was enough to demonstrate that the 
concept could work.
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The other partners from the A2I proj-
ect were offered to become share-
holders in the endeavor, yet only 
Mekan chose to invest, buying a 4% 
ownership of the company. The re-
maining 96% of shares were evenly 
distributed between Enviclean and 
NOVI. DanChurchAid were also 
interested, but made demands that 
were not acceptable to the other 
owners. Additionally, there were a 
series of ethical considerations con-
cerning an NGO owning a commer-
cial company, whose product also 
had potential military uses.
The business model at the time was 
to buy the necessary components 
and software from different suppliers 
to assemble a finished unit, which 
could carry a certain margin. Name-
ly, this entailed utilizing the already 
established network. NetImage was 
to uncover user needs and design 
the user interface. Mekan was to be 
responsible for the milling and pro-
duction of prototypes. Gomspace 
was to create electronic compo-
nents and the autopilot. Danish 
Aerotech was to assemble the units. 
DanChurchAid was to be a sparring 
partner in terms of the design. The 
company Sky-Watch was thereby 
to consist of the necessary distribu-
tion channels, while the necessary 
knowledge largely resided with the 
partners.
In that respect, the network became 
organized more like a traditional 
value chain, with a series of sup-
pliers for the different components. 
At the time, the ambition was for 
Sky-Watch to only design the frame 
of the helicopter, onto which all the 
other components were to be at-
tached. In that respect, the network 
almost exclusively focused on the 
development of the mechanical 
solution, as it was assumed that 
the components available would be 
adequate.
Sky-Watch is formed
Following the demonstration, Enviclean founded the company Sky-Watch with 
NOVI as co-owner. Jonas Johansen was made CEO of the company. 
ICI Case Book
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Sky-Watch realized that to build a 
profitable business, they needed to 
be able to access several different 
segments. This, in turn, required 
them to take control of the central 
hard- and software competences to 
produce a solution that was flexible 
enough to be quickly adapted to 
new applications. This would also 
increase the value of the firm, as 
they would come to possess a range 
of product competences within their 
field.
Many of the electrical components 
were bought off the shelf, while 
central circuit boards were designed 
in-house and subsequently made 
to order from suppliers. The man-
ufacturing of the shell was to be 
handled by suppliers based on the 
blueprints from Sky-Watch. Yet, the 
demand for rapid prototypes and the 
unreasonable costs associated with 
small batch productions later led 
the company to acquire a 3D printer. 
This was, in part, used to manufac-
ture prototypes, but also to produce 
small special parts for limited batch 
productions.
This made it relevant to reevalu-
ate the included partners. With the 
control system in-house, Gomspace 
largely became superfluous, yet 
collaboration continued on differ-
ent shared components. NetImage 
proved not to possess the neces-
sary competences for designing a 
user interface for a helicopter, as 
it required significant knowledge 
regarding how a helicopter operat-
ed. Furthermore, Mekan proved less 
relevant, as a larger part of the new 
design was to be in plastic. Danish 
Aerotech continued as a sparring 
partner, as they worked within a 
non-competing common area. In 
that respect, Danish Aerotech had 
significant insights into the legisla-
tion within the area, while Sky-Watch 
could provide them with insights into 
a new, interesting market segment. 
DanChurchAid also continued, as 
they maintained an interest in the 
products and could help introduce 
Sky-Watch to the NGO segment. In 
that respect, DanChurchAid proved 
to be a valuable partner as it actively 
pushed the story of the collaboration 
on the press. This generated some 
attention toward the project, which, 
in turn, provided some legitimacy, 
Insourcing
During the summer of 2010, Sky-Watch realized that the chosen model was not 
viable. On the one hand, they had significant problems concerning their suppliers’ 
ability to deliver, which made it difficult to control development and production. 
What was most important was that the software/hardware solution previously 
employed was very difficult to configure to other purposes than originally 
intended. This was, in part, due to a poorly managed codebase, along with 
inflexible hardware.
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which could be used for the military 
and commercial segments.
Thus, the network around Sky-
Watch was structured in such a 
manner that it was consistent with 
the changed structure and purpose 
of the firm. In that respect, a new 
network was configured based on a 
more value-chain-based approach, 
in which Sky-Watch would carefully 
choose which activities were essen-
tial to the company, and which were 
best served through outsourcing. 
Additionally, Sky-Watch began 
looking thoroughly into the sales 
possibilities in the NGO market. 
This proved significantly difficult to 
penetrate, as NGOs typically do not 
contain the means to make invest-
ments, as these are brought in from 
the outside through sponsorships 
of specific projects. This meant 
uncertainty and long lead times. 
Furthermore, sales to the UN system 
required suppliers to have an es-
tablished sales record, along with a 
stock inventory and other resources, 
which Sky-Watch, at the time, did 
not possess.
Consequently, the firm began un-
covering the possibilities in serving 
other segments, especially focusing 
on industrial inspection and military 
uses. In that respect, the company 
continued to emphasize a network 
approach by searching for potential 
partnerships with actors with exist-
ing distribution and sales channels 
in those segments.
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This made the firm realize that fulfill-
ing this potential would be extremely 
difficult. They would have to develop 
or purchase specific components 
and integrate the necessary da-
ta-treatment processes associated 
with areas in which they were not 
competent. The solution was devel-
oped in collaboration with ICI. The 
helicopter was to be considered as a 
basic unit (a platform), which con-
tained different possibilities for at-
taching other components. Thereby, 
the functionality could be extended 
significantly.
On the product level, this meant that 
the helicopter was to contain new 
functionalities, which would enable 
the unit to send data back to the 
control station, along with the ability 
to control the attached equipment.
In that respect, Sky-Watch changed 
character. From having been a 
firm focused on visual documen-
tation through a camera, the visual 
became a part-component in the 
guidance of the helicopter, onto 
which other components could be 
attached. Thus, the firm created 
a platform where the possibilities 
would be highly dependent on the 
application possibilities developed 
by other partners. This enabled the 
firm to overcome the limitations they 
previously operated under regard-
ing spreading the product to new 
segments. This would just mean 
that they would have to find the right 
partners to develop the application 
possibilities.
The context for this is also that 
Sky-Watch began reconsidering 
what constituted its core competen-
cies. Rather than only considering 
itself as a development company 
specialized within UAV helicopter 
solutions, the company realized that 
its competences were not necessar-
ily helicopter specific. Rather, it was 
the actual control of autonomous 
units. This hinted at the control and 
guidance competences of the firm 
being applied to other units, for 
example, small submarines. Yet, 
the helicopter solution remained 
the core product that was to drive 
the firm. This necessitated that the 
product was finished, manufactured, 
and distributed. As such, the firm 
had laid out the groundwork for a 
two-sided business model, in which 
one aspect targeted selling control 
and guidance competences, while 
the other targeted the helicopter 
solution. To build profitability, the 
firm chose to focus specifically on 
the helicopter solution by building a 
production and distribution network 
specifically for the helicopter.
The platform approach
Subsequently, Sky-Watch began uncovering more application possibilities, 
which made it evident that the product had great potential. Through talks with 
different actors in widely differing businesses, many alternative possibilities 
were discovered. Yet all of these would require specialized equipment beyond a 
camera.
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This consisted of a number of 
initiatives. On the production side, 
the firm realized the need to be able 
to scale quickly and efficiently, and 
began establishing contact with Chi-
nese and East-European manufac-
turing companies. This was done to 
enable a fast ramp up of the produc-
tion to be able to follow up on the 
anticipated sales. This meant that all 
fabrication was placed outside the 
firm to ensure delivery and quality. 
Furthermore, the firm implemented 
an enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) system to support the new 
configuration.
Simultaneously, the firm began 
further expanding its dealer net-
work. This was done by establishing 
contacts to different partners within 
the respective segments. The aim 
was to reduce the costs associated 
with sales and marketing by utilizing 
the existing sales channels of the 
partners.
Global production and sales
In order to sum up the case the latest developments are outlined here. During the 
summer of 2012, the helicopter solution was specifically developed. 
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Summary
The Mobile Tracking network focused on 
building business models in relation to data 
concerning the location of pedestrians and the 
flow of road traffic. As such, the purpose was to 
create knowledge-based business models with 
great value for buyers with wildly different 
needs for data and knowledge.
Mobile 
Tracking
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Furthermore, the case presents the issues related to 
presenting, quantifying, and specifying the value prop-
osition for a host of potential buyers. In that respect, 
the case illustrates the importance of developing and 
designing business models that are aligned with the 
targeted customer segments. This also highlights the 
resistance that such an endeavor can produce in es-
tablished organizations in which the existing business 
model becomes the biggest obstacle to innovation. 
Lastly, the case is a good example of the importance 
of building business models internally in the network in 
such a manner that the relation between the partners is 
clearly and well defined early on in the process. Thus, 
the case demonstrates the need to be explicit about the 
expectations placed on potential partners early on in 
the process to avoid conflicting interests. For instance, 
BLIP Systems was initially unwilling to sign an exclusive 
contract in the Nordic countries with COWI. In another 
context, such a set-up had cost them millions of DKK. 
However, BLIP changed its opinion concerning this 
point later in the project. 
Despite an enormous presumed value creation for the buyers, the case 
illustrates the issues that arise when the customers are not aligned with the 
business model of an incumbent firm.
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COWI was the initiator of the project. COWI is one of Denmark’s largest 
engineering firms, with an international presence. The basic idea was to utilize 
the broad use of cellphones to create anonymous data on movement patterns for 
both pedestrians and cars.
Introduction
Subsequently, the purpose of the 
network was to build a network that 
possessed the necessary technolo-
gy for gathering data, while also cre-
ating viable business models for the 
data collected. The primary, initial 
focus was to create business mod-
els based on knowledge concerning 
urban movement patterns.
The project stemmed from COWI 
being used to working with different 
types of data on urban and traf-
fic movements in relation to their 
engineering services. These data 
were often procured using simple 
means, for example, manual counts 
on pedestrians. The ambition of the 
network was thereby to create inno-
vative methods of creating the data 
while ensuring that the data was 
transformed into value for relevant 
actors. This was to give COWI the 
ability to build a business based on 
the collected data. Additionally, the 
network was equally concerned with 
how the data suppliers could create 
business models that were aligned 
with COWI’s business concept. In 
that respect, the goal from the start 
was to find a partner who already 
had the necessary data available.
The network project was highly un-
usual for COWI, as it did not usually 
venture into innovation projects as 
such. Traditionally, the company 
sought projects that were much fur-
ther developed. Yet, the economic 
funding from ICI helped ensure that 
the project could be initiated within 
COWI, with the prerequisite support 
from management.
ICI Case Book
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During the initial dialogue with ICI, no actual partners were involved. At the time, 
the network was simply an idea created within COWI. In the dialogue with ICI, it 
became evident that the partners of the project were to come from two categories. 
These were the data suppliers and the data users, respectively. 
The partners
These were the data suppliers and 
the data users, respectively. The 
goal was for COWI to act as the part 
that refined and communicated the 
data. This would make COWI the 
link between the actors producing 
the data and those who were to use 
the data in a processed or refined 
form.
To find relevant partners for the data 
collection, ICI and COWI’s network 
at Aalborg University was used to 
uncover, which technologies were 
relevant and economically feasible. 
In that respect, this served as the 
foundation for finding partners who 
utilized these technologies.
On the user side, the early assump-
tion was that the primary focus 
would be on working with data 
concerning pedestrian movements. 
Therefore, the network sought 
partners who could potentially take 
advantage of data on pedestrian 
movements, and the aim was to 
receive their inputs, thereby using 
them as lead-users.
BLIP Systems (BLIP) specialized in 
systems for tracking cellphones by 
tracking the Bluetooth connection. 
This is possible as each Bluetooth 
unit has a unique ID. Prior to the cre-
ation of the network, BLIP had main-
ly focused on selling tracking units 
to airports. Thus, the collaboration 
with COWI served as a way of open-
ing up new business areas. While 
originally thought of as an additional 
technology for indoor tracking, BLIP 
later became a key partner in the 
network. This development will be 
explained later.
TDC is one of the largest cellphone 
operators in Denmark and was 
originally thought of as the primary 
supplier of raw data. This was tech-
nically possible through the triangu-
lation of cellphone signals that could 
generate the location data. Yet, TDC 
chose to exit the network early in the 
process. This was due to legal con-
cerns, combined with the business 
model foundation for the collabora-
tion. Additionally, the return-on-in-
vestment period for such a project 
would be quite elongated, which did 
not fit the current strategy of TDC.
On the buyer side, the network at-
tempted to engage different partners 
in the form of Aalborg City Associ-
ation, Aalborg municipality, Visit 
Nordjylland, Nordjyllands Kyst-
museum, TK Development, and 
Nybolig Erhverv. Thus, the network 
engaged a wide assortment of ac-
tors who might have had an interest 
in urban pedestrian movements. 
These actors could participate in 
the dialogue regarding which data 
could be used by different actors, 
while also providing arguments on 
different aspects of the project. This 
could concern economic aspects as 
well as, for instance, how the owner-
ship should be structured. 
Furthermore, the network collaborat-
ed with Friis Citycenter in Aalborg 
outside of ICI. This was used as a 
test center for validating the pre-
cision of the collected data from 
BLIP’s systems.
ICI Case Book
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As mentioned above, the network chose to target the pedestrian segment early on 
in the process. Yet, throughout the process, it was always evident that there was 
also an inherent potential in tracking traffic in relation to controlling traffic. 
However, this was not addressed until later in the process.
The business model’s 
development
As mentioned earlier, TDC withdrew 
from the network early on, which 
left BLIP as the only possible data 
supplier. Subsequently, much of the 
business model development came 
to center on whether BLIP could 
align with COWI’s existing business 
model. This entailed considerations 
on how the business model be-
tween BLIP and COWI was to be 
structured in relation to revenues, 
resources, and activities. 
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The system contains a series of 
Bluetooth sensors, which are in-
stalled in the area from which data is 
sought. Subsequently, the sensors 
pick up all active Bluetooth units 
within a certain range. This is cou-
pled with an approximation of the 
Bluetooth unit’s location along with 
its speed and direction. Each Blue-
tooth unit carries a unique media ac-
cess control (MAC) address, which 
enables the system to not only track 
a unit passing by a sensor, but to 
track the actual movements of the 
unit through multiple sensors. The 
logged MAC addresses are anony-
mous, in that they cannot be directly 
tied to certain individuals. In this 
respect, the system is not in conflict 
with legislation on personal data.
The MAC address, time, and place-
ment are logged and transmitted 
through wireless Internet to a 
cloud-based data-system hosted by 
BLIP. Subsequently, it is possible to 
present the data using BLIP’s own 
front-end software or through other 
front ends using different application 
programming interfaces (APIs).  In 
this way partners can attach them-
selves to the data.
During the ICI project, it was found 
that the number of active Bluetooth 
units was declining. This prompted 
BLIP to extend its system in such 
a way that it could also track Wi-Fi 
signals. In relation to data collection, 
Wi-Fi signals are nearly identical to 
Bluetooth signals.
Additionally, during the network proj-
ect, it became evident that to create 
collaboration between BLIP and 
COWI, BLIP’s sensors would have 
to be suited to outdoor installation. 
Previously, they had only worked on 
indoor installations. This prompted 
BLIP to develop a weatherproof 
encapsulation for its system, com-
bined with battery backup. This is 
to be seen as a natural extension of 
BLIP’s business, as it provided the 
means for entering new markets. 
Yet, it was still a prerequisite for the 
setting up of the partnership.
The BLIP data-gathering 
system and its development
In order to grasp the challenges associated with the development of the business 
model, it is first necessary to understand the components that make up the BLIP 
data-gathering system.
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At this point, no clearly defined, 
long-term business model was 
defined between the two parties. 
Yet, the model for the data valida-
tion was for BLIP to provide the 
necessary equipment for free, and 
thereby give COWI the possibility 
of being able to test the equipment. 
For COWI, the aim was to establish 
whether the available technology 
could provide the data needed for 
further processing. BLIP, on the 
other hand, saw an opportunity for 
having its technology sanctioned 
relatively cheaply. Additionally, the 
collaboration with COWI provided 
BLIP with access to a range of cus-
tomers that it had not previously had 
access to.
The abovementioned translated into 
an arrangement with Friis Citycenter, 
which had the equipment installed. 
Friis had already installed people 
counters at all entrances, which 
made it possible to compare this 
data with that from BLIP’s da-
ta-gathering system. Concurrently, 
COWI carried out a series of tests 
at its own office, along with a series 
of closed tests aimed at assessing 
the system’s viability for monitoring 
traffic.
Taken together, the tests evidenced 
that the system was technically ma-
ture enough to handle the data gath-
ering. Though far from all individuals 
had an active Bluetooth unit on them 
that could then be registered, it was 
possible to extrapolate the data in a 
manner that provided a quite precise 
picture of the movement patterns. 
However, the data validation took 
a disproportionate amount of time. 
During this time, the work on the 
business model and structure of 
the partnership was postponed. 
Much of this is largely attributable to 
COWI’s traditional method of doing 
business.
Data validation
Early on in the process, the two core partners, COWI and BLIP, emphasized the 
validation of the collected data. It was important for both parties to ensure that the 
data collected was so statistically sound that it was possible to estimate the total 
traffic and the movement patterns.
ICI Case Book
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The entire premise of this business 
model thereby rested on a single 
actor who had the necessary means 
to make the necessary investments. 
Yet, this was in stark contrast to the 
customer segments that had been 
identified, as these were most often 
small local businesses that did not 
possess the necessary funds or the 
will to bear the risk. It was evident in 
the network that the concept con-
tained potential. Yet, neither COWI 
nor BLIP wanted to make the invest-
ments. BLIP was essentially only 
concerned with selling equipment, 
while COWI was only interested in 
purchasing the data and process-
ing it. This proved to be a serious 
conflict amongst the partners 
regarding how the mutual business 
was to be structured. Subsequently, 
this became the key theme of the 
network’s continued development. 
The central issue was that none of 
the partners had the desire to make 
the necessary investments.
BLIP offered to install the sensors 
for free, given that COWI would 
commit to long-term agreements 
for purchasing the data from the 
system. This was rejected by COWI, 
as it meant that it would have to 
commit to costs that could not 
necessarily be paid by a single cus-
tomer. COWI’s approach was thus 
that it sought to gain on-demand 
access to data, which the company 
could subsequently process and bill 
directly to its customers. This could 
potentially be in the form of ongoing 
subscriptions. In that respect, COWI 
wanted the network to be an exten-
sion of its existing business model. 
This entailed customers paying for 
specific services, which meant that 
COWI would incur no expenses 
until the company was guaranteed 
payment.
The conclusion was that COWI 
sought for BLIP to install the neces-
sary equipment, after which COWI 
could purchase the available data 
for their customers. Simultaneously, 
COWI sought to achieve exclusive 
rights to the data collected, yet at 
a price that was not acceptable to 
BLIP.
The network concluded that it would 
be necessary to find actors who 
Ownership structure
The work on business models began in the spring of 2011. This was aimed at 
uncovering how the ownership structure among the partners should be built. At 
the time, the premise was for BLIP to supply the system, which the customers 
paid for. Additionally, an installer was to set up the system, while COWI would 
focus on building value on top of the collected data through their engineering 
competences.
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would be interested in paying for 
the installation of the equipment, 
as this was the missing piece of the 
business model. Thus, the focus 
shifted to uncovering a partner with 
the necessary funds and interest in 
installing the required equipment. 
Yet, this also presented a series of 
challenges for COWI, as it meant 
that the data gathered would belong 
to the investor in the equipment, 
which would mean that COWI could 
not ensure any advantages.
This ended in a model under which 
COWI acted as engineering coun-
selor within urban planning, as the 
company had traditionally done 
with construction projects. BLIP’s 
data-gathering system was added 
to COWI’s portfolio of products 
available to customers under the 
COWI City-Sense brand. This was 
combined with an ongoing subscrip-
tion for the data collected, delivered 
through COWI. As such, both COWI 
and BLIP were ensured a viable 
business model, as BLIP would also 
receive ongoing payments for the 
data delivered.
Accordingly, the challenge turned 
toward uncovering actors who were 
willing to pay for the installation 
of the system and commit to the 
subscriptions. Yet, this required a 
much sharper focus on the value 
that the collected data could pro-
vide for the customers. This had 
not been addressed previously. This 
lack was highly attributed to the 
network’s detailed attention on the 
technical validation of the data col-
lected. Subsequently, in the autumn 
of 2011, the network began trying 
to describe the value offered by its 
data service for different actors.
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As mentioned earlier, the emphasis 
was on tracking pedestrians. This 
became the guide for the work on 
clarifying the value proposition. 
This emphasis is also evident in 
the makeup of the partners in the 
network on the buyer side. In close 
collaboration with ICI, the network 
began trying to uncover how the 
value could be quantified for differ-
ent potential buyers. The first step 
was to specify which buyers were 
relevant, which was implicitly done 
through the partnership process. 
This placed the emphasis on how 
shops, city associations, shopping 
centers, and real estate brokers 
could utilize the data to optimize 
their own processes.
The notion was that shops, based 
on the correct presentation of the 
data, would be able to optimize their 
staffing and potential promotion 
events depending on the number of 
pedestrians in the city. City associ-
ations could use the data to specify 
the effect of various initiatives, which 
was successfully tested during 
the event Aalborg In Red. Shop-
ping centers could create a better 
overview of the customer flow within 
their premises, which would enable 
them to optimize the shop layout. 
Lastly, real estate brokers could use 
data to create better pricings for 
commercial buildings, based on the 
knowledge of how many potential 
customers would pass by.
This approach exposed two charac-
teristic, yet interrelated issues, which 
were very closely related to COWI’s 
existing business model.
On the one hand, COWI struggled 
with creating and absorbing the pre-
requisite understanding on the value 
created for the customer. This was 
closely related to COWI’s traditional 
cost plus margin approach for all its 
engineering services. This did not 
take into consideration the value 
actually created for customers, and, 
accordingly, the price they would be 
willing to pay for the services. There 
was a widespread recognition that 
the system potentially had great 
value, yet the network was unsuc-
cessful in quantifying this.
On the other hand, the work on clar-
ifying the value proposition showed 
that the concept had value-creation 
potential for a series of small actors, 
yet none of them had the necessary 
funds to invest in equipment. This 
was in stark contrast to COWI’s 
traditional business, which primarily 
dealt with advising larger companies 
and public entities. This also en-
tailed a distinct single actor with the 
necessary resources to invest in the 
necessary equipment.
The value proposition
The work on the value proposition of the concept was largely influenced by 
COWI’s existing business model. In this, the company would sell engineering 
services at cost plus a margin. This basic approach to pricing made it difficult for 
the network to establish a value model on the actual worth of the collected data 
for potential buyers.
ICI Case Book
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This shift is to be viewed in relation 
to an internal reorganization within 
COWI. This placed the traffic depart-
ment alongside the urban-planning 
department, which had previously 
handled the collaboration with BLIP. 
These had previously been separate 
entities within COWI. This created 
closer ties between the people as-
signed to City-Sense and the traffic 
department. This made it apparent 
that COWI could ensure that the 
City-Sense solution was added to 
tenders for the construction and 
renovation of roads.
This change toward traffic tracking 
made municipals and similar en-
tities the primary customers. The 
work with these bodies proved early 
on that they were most interested 
in purchasing data subscriptions. 
Additionally, they often sought to 
install the equipment themselves, 
as they already had the necessary 
personnel and equipment needed. In 
that respect, the need for a partner 
to install the equipment was abol-
ished. Accordingly, the tasks that 
were originally to be placed with an 
installer were distributed amongst 
COWI, BLIP, and the buyers. BLIP 
became responsible for the tech-
nology and the operations of the 
systems. COWI became responsible 
for defining installation diagrams, 
the proactive sales work, and acting 
at the front end for customers by 
having the solution branded as 
COWI City-Sense.
Consequently, the customers 
bought a data subscription for a 
given period to which BLIP would 
supply the equipment. For BLIP, this 
was essentially a payment in install-
ments. BLIP would receive 70% 
of the subscription revenue, while 
COWI would receive 30%. Further-
more, COWI had the opportunity of 
using the collected data as a means 
of selling extra engineering services. 
Lastly, COWI would receive 50% of 
any extra revenue generated from 
selling data to other parties. This 
was possible, as BLIP would contin-
ue to own all the data.
Thereby, COWI was ensured an ex-
tra value proposition for its custom-
ers using its own name and brand. 
Furthermore, it provided COWI with 
the opportunity to build further busi-
ness over a longer term. For BLIP, 
the agreement opened up a com-
pletely new business area through 
utilizing COWI as a sales channel. 
This was made possible through the 
configuration of a business model 
between the partners. The collabo-
ration with COWI and the extensive 
data validation had approved the 
system. This could potentially open 
up new partnerships within other 
areas.
Emphasizing traffic and 
configuration
Thus, working with many small actors posed a series of challenges and placed 
certain demands on the business model. This understanding was essential in 
moving the project forward, as COWI and BLIP chose to focus on tracking traffic 
instead. 
ICI Case Book
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Initially, COWI was presented with a 
range of potential buyers of pedes-
trian movement data to try to sub-
stantiate the value of the concept. 
Furthermore, ICI worked diligently 
on explaining and describing the 
value in being able to sell data 
directly, rather than having to wait 
for an actor to install and pay for the 
equipment. Thus, ICI heavily encour-
aged COWI to consider investing 
in the equipment. Yet, this did not 
come to fruition.
Pedestrians continued
ICI and COWI continued collaborating on creating a business model for tracking 
pedestrians. Namely, this process emphasized moving from essentially trying to 
sell units to selling data. This was materialized through a series of workshops and 
a meeting with the ICI Senior Advisory Board. 
ICI Case Book
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Mobile Tracking › On BLIP’s engagement
It is interesting to note that despite the severe issues faced early on in the 
partnership, BLIP chose to maintain the collaboration with COWI to develop a 
new and mutually beneficial business model. In that respect, it is relevant to look 
into BLIP’s antecedents.
On BLIP’s 
engagement
Preceding the Mobile Tracking 
network, BLIP had a core business 
in tracking facilities for airports. The 
main share of its revenue was gener-
ated from sales, along with some 
from service and maintenance. As 
such, the company possessed great 
experience in servicing airports. Yet, 
the BLIP management had recently 
decided that the company was to 
pursue new markets for its tracking 
technology.
Accordingly, BLIP had already es-
tablished its interest in opening new 
markets. In that respect, the partner-
ship with COWI was ideal. Addition-
ally, the partnership provided BLIP 
with the opportunity to have their 
system validated by COWI, which 
could further increase the value of 
BLIP’s products.
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/61
ICI Case Book
Mobile Tracking › The challenges of the business model
The initial focus on tracking pedestrians was largely attributable to the way the 
network defined its subsequent challenges. The consequence of focusing on a 
customer segment that did not have the necessary budgets was that the partners 
were forced to consider unattractive business models. The lack of a clear 
business was highly instrumental in creating conflicts between the two parties, 
which almost killed the network.
The challenges of the 
business model
Based on a particular customer seg-
ment, the challenge was to design 
a business model that was aligned 
with the customers’ economic char-
acteristics. This proved impossible, 
in part due to the lack of a clear val-
ue proposition and means of deliver-
ing it. Only when the network shifted 
its focus toward tracking traffic was 
a clearer business model able to be 
devised. Namely, the value proposi-
tion for customers was clear and the 
revenue streams were compatible 
with both core companies. Yet, this 
required a rigidly defined structure 
amongst the partners to ensure a 
fair distribution of revenue in rela-
tion to the value that each partner 
provided.
In retrospect, the network should 
have taken the consequences of the 
business model issues more seri-
ously. This should have prompted 
the network to change its focus ear-
lier. The lack of refocus is, however, 
also tied to COWI’s previous seg-
regation between urban and traffic 
departments. It was the combination 
of the two departments that created 
clarity on the value potential inherent 
within tracking traffic, along with 
how the business model was to be 
structured.
Subsequently, BLIP has successfully 
copied the business model outside 
the Nordic countries (for example, in 
New Zealand: http://nordjyske.dk/
mobil-artikel/nordjysk-firma-maaler-
trafik-i-new-zealand/b9af4229-b62f-
4ad5-b9ad-9de9d5b3ee87/1567 ).
For COWI, it seems that a huge 
international potential is not being 
tapped, perhaps due to it lacking the 
ability to support intrapreneurship; 
that is, developing new business 
areas within the organization. 
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Summary
The Provital network was the first network to 
be established during the ICI project. Thus, 
the network became the testing area for how 
the ICI project was to function when going 
forward. In that respect, the network was of-
ten used as the prototype for how ICI projects 
should function. Accordingly, the process has 
not always been completely streamlined into 
the business model concept as the guiding 
premise.
Provital 
Solutions
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/63
This filtration technology had a series of advantages 
compared to, for example, sand filtration. This made 
the product more energy efficient and environmentally 
friendly, while also taking up less physical space for the 
customer. Furthermore, when utilized for cleaning spas 
and pools, the system could provide a series of health 
benefits, as it reduced the need for chlorine and other 
chemicals. Despite the obvious advantages, the case 
will illustrate how a superior product does not always 
equal a successful business in terms of market share 
and strong revenue. A solid and well-functioning busi-
ness model is equally important. 
The Provital network was aimed at developing a business model 
for commercializing a series of newly developed applications of a 
groundbreaking filtration technology. This technology was built around 
membranes made of silicon carbide (SiC). 
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The company Provital Solutions (Provital) was founded in 2008 as a joint 
venture between CoMeTas and Kaj Larsen VVS. Initially, the company mainly 
acted as a shelf company. In this period, Kaj Larsen paid the salary of the single 
employee, Paw Juul, who was situated in Kaj Larsen’s premises. In 2009, Paw 
Juul was transferred to Provital, injecting actual activities into the firm.
From the beginning, the mission of 
Provital was to create water-filtration 
solutions better than those currently 
on the market. Furthermore, the firm 
was to extend membrane technolo-
gy to markets that had not previous-
ly used filtration solutions. Though 
the case appears to take its depar-
ture in a customer-driven approach 
to value creation, the case contains 
insights into how the alternation 
between upstream and downstream 
activities of the business on the one 
hand created possibilities, yet on the 
other, created a series of conflicts.
ICI Case Book
Provital › Introduction
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Provital’s story is an example of an unstructured innovation process, which 
has its starting point in special knowledge on a product or a technology, which is 
vested in an entrepreneur. As such, the process is characterized by a large degree 
of focus on the development of the product and the product solution. 
This is in contrast to focusing on the 
business-related aspects concern-
ing the identification of end users 
and user needs, along with how to 
market the product. As a conse-
quence thereof, the process has 
generally not focused directly on 
business models and the invention 
of new business models. Rather, the 
emphasis has been on developing 
a business model around a product 
idea and bringing this to market.
Kaj Larsen possessed a strong set 
of competences within plumbing. 
Through this experience, the com-
pany also possessed a great net-
work within the industry. This was 
coupled with the SiC membrane 
technology, which provided special 
technology knowledge between the 
knowledge areas. Accordingly, the 
network worked diligently on identi-
fying potential product applications 
for this combination. The collabo-
ration was initiated in 2006. During 
the first 12–18 months, Provital 
created a series of ideas within spas 
and pools, water treatment, smoke 
scrubbers, car washes, slurry sepa-
ration, fish farms, potato water, and 
dry docks. In that respect, proto-
types were made for pool filtration, 
car washes, and slurry separation, 
which were tested internally and at 
external partners. Characteristic for 
this period was that Provital did not 
consider which product applications 
had the greatest and most readily 
available potential. Furthermore, 
they did not consider how the sales 
were to be handled and through 
which distribution channels. There 
was a strong presumption that the 
technology had great potential. Yet, 
the emphasis was solely on proving 
the potential through prototypes and 
tests within different areas.
Having participated in a Blue 
Ocean course at Aalborg Univer-
sity, Provital was brought in to the 
newly established ICI project in the 
middle of 2008. At this stage, the 
company was introduced to the 
business model concept and the 
notion of creating business models 
in networks. At the time, ICI had no 
broadly accepted comprehension of 
what constituted a network-based 
business model or how to develop 
and design such models. As such, 
partners for the ICI network (the Pro-
vital network) were brought in based 
on their previous engagement in 
the development of the application 
possibilities for the membranes.
ICI Case Book
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CoMeTas (currently LiqTech) is 
active within the development, 
manufacture and supply of silicon 
carbide ceramics for the purification 
of liquids and gasses.
Kaj Larsen VVS is a plumbing and 
along CoMeTas a core part from the 
outset of the network. 
GPA Flowsystems supplied stan-
dard components used in the sys-
tem. Yet, the company later exited 
as official partners, as it merely 
sought to act as a supplier. Addi-
tionally, it did not want to sell goods 
at cost price, as it had other busi-
ness with Kaj Larsen VVS. Still, GPA 
Flowsystems was a valuable partner, 
as Provital could draw on its experi-
ences regarding which components 
to use for the new system.
Netlon, provided specialized con-
trol systems for the filtration units. 
Netlon had previously worked with 
automated control systems. The 
contact between Provital and Netlon 
was made through Provital’s earlier 
work with Dansk Olie Måler Service 
(DOMS) on a filtration system for 
car washes. In that respect, Netlon 
was the default supplier for DOMS, 
which made Netlon a natural part-
ner. Later in the process, it became 
evident that Netlon did not possess 
the necessary competences for 
controlling such a system, as their 
competences mainly related to pure-
ly electrical systems. 
Technodan Industrial Controls 
(TIC) later in the process took over 
the role of Netlon.
Kemic Vandrens was brought into 
the network based on its experience 
with water-treatment plants and 
other industrial water treatments. 
Yet, due to the direction later chosen 
by the network, the company was 
essentially made superfluous. 
Skallerup Klit was brought in, as 
they had a Provital solution installed 
at their pool facilities. Thus, they 
acted as a test center and as a base 
for the pilot project for the appli-
cation possibilities within spas and 
pools.
ICI Case Book
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Provital › The partners › Business models
Thus, the current situation was not 
appropriate for creating a viable 
business. Through a series of work-
shops arranged by ICI, the network 
realized that it had to focus its sales 
and marketing efforts on a clearly 
defined market to achieve commer-
cial success. Following a careful 
analysis aided by ICI, the spa and 
pool market was selected. This was 
based on:
- Existing competencies within the 
field
- Pre-existing knowledge and net-
work in the market
- The relative simplicity of the tech-
nical solution
- It was the only solution that was 
being tested with a potential 
customer
In collaboration with ICI, a subse-
quent risk analysis was drawn up, 
resulting in an action plan aimed at 
bringing the spa and pool solution 
to market. Thus, the work on the 
spa and pool solution was inten-
sified to complete the technical 
solution. Yet, the network did not 
manage to maintain its focus, and 
spent time installing test facilities for 
other applications. This was partly 
due to the spa and pool market not 
developing as expected, combined 
with Kaj Larsen, which financed the 
endeavor, having economic difficul-
ties, in part due to the bankruptcy 
of its local bank during the period. 
Subsequently, it appeared that Pro-
vital sought quick gains by pursu-
ing other applications within slurry 
separation: the filtration of car water 
and water from potato cleaning, all 
of which brought no commercial 
success. During this period, the firm 
was almost forced to close down. 
Provital and ICI discussed what to 
do about it. Without the investment, 
the firm would most likely have filed 
for bankruptcy. Additionally, the in-
vestment from NOVI, combined with 
the argumentation from ICI provided 
renewed faith in the commercial 
potential of the concept. 
Business models
When the involvement with ICI began toward the end of 2008, it became evident 
that the current situation was not feasible. It was clear that Provital did not 
have the necessary resources needed to pursue too many different application 
possibilities. 
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Provital › The partners › Business models › Identifying decision makers
Thus, the focus had been on larger 
facilities. The reason for the lack of 
market penetration can be attributed 
to Provital making a direct sales ef-
fort toward large swimming facilities. 
These were mostly publicly owned 
institutions, without funds or the 
mandate for making investments. All 
of their investments would have to 
go through a public tender. Accord-
ingly, the network and ICI worked on 
mapping the decision process and 
the decision makers associated with 
public tenders. This was to uncover 
which actors had influence on cus-
tomer relations. Subsequently, the 
following actors were identified:
- Installers
- Contractors
- Advisory engineers
- Pool attendants
- Public officials
Having identified these actors, 
Provital began an intensive sales 
effort. This was directed toward all 
of the above actors simultaneously 
to create the necessary relationship 
with the customers. The reason for 
this was that it had been found that 
each of the multiple actors could 
single-handedly veto an alternative 
filtration system. As Provital initiated 
its heavy sales effort, it experienced 
a great deal of resistance. Typical-
ly, one party would resist or deny 
working with a new, alternative, 
and in their eyes, unproven filtration 
solution. Alternatively, the rejection 
of the Provital solution was based 
on the higher initial costs of the Pro-
vital system. In that respect, public 
tenders do not take any potential 
operations savings into consider-
ation, unless it is written into the 
tender from the start. This became 
very clear for Provital in relation to 
the tender around the swimming 
pool in Gigantium in Aalborg. ICI 
also supported tests being carried 
out in Gladsaxe Swimming Pool.
These two combined factors hin-
dered Provital from winning tenders. 
Even though in the period from April 
2009 to the end of 2011 the com-
pany had two different sales direc-
tors employed, it did not live up to 
the task. As such, Provital did not 
possess the necessary resources 
needed to influence the decision 
makers. Furthermore, it did not have 
the access needed to influence the 
contents of the tender in a manner 
that would make the Provital solu-
tion preferable.
Identifying decision 
makers
At this stage, it was evident that the product was not attractive to the segment 
of small, often private swimming pools. This was primarily due to the cost of 
purchase, combined with negligible savings on operations, as the load on smaller 
pools was typically very small. 
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Provital › The partners › Business models › Internationalizing
The Californian market appeared 
attractive at the time, due to the 
increasing pressure on its water 
supply. In that respect, ICI also 
provided apparent access, as the 
academic manager of the network 
was working from the United States 
at the time. Despite attempts to es-
tablish contact with American firms, 
no collaboration emerged from the 
attempts.
Yet, contact was established to a 
single-person business in Germa-
ny. This was to drive the sales in 
the German market. The idea was 
to install a test facility in Hamburg. 
However, Provital lacked the neces-
sary funds and the German partner 
was not interested in bearing the 
risk. As a consequence, the idea 
was scrapped.
Furthermore, Provital realized that 
there were some practical issues 
that had to be overcome. Concisely, 
the installation, start-up, and main-
tenance of the facility could only be 
done by the employees of Provital 
and Kaj Larsen. Thus, Provital was 
faced with the challenge of creating 
and designing a business model 
that could alleviate the sales issues, 
while also addressing the practical 
problems associated with installa-
tion, start-up, and maintenance.
The first foundation for a subsequent 
breakthrough for Provital was made 
during a conference in Holland, 
which it attended with CoMeTas. At 
the conference, Provital established 
contact with Enwa, a large installer 
in the Norwegian market. Enwa also 
had departments in Sweden and 
was interested in Provital’s solution. 
Later an arrangement was made 
under which Enwa would primarily 
take care of  the entire sales effort. 
Thus, Provital would become a sup-
plier who also delivered knowledge 
on the implementation and opera-
tions of the system along with sales 
training for Enwa’s sales personnel. 
Subsequently, Enwa would primar-
ily be in charge of the installation, 
maintenance, and operations. Fur-
thermore, Enwa was large enough to 
influence the entire tender process 
and to have the necessary resources 
to influence all decision makers.
This became the archetype for the 
sales in Provital’s business model. 
Thus, it would target its sales efforts 
toward actors with the necessary 
size and will to drive the sales of 
Provital’s solutions. Accordingly, 
Provital would become a supplier. In 
that respect, Provital began learning 
how it could create value for other 
actors in the value network. This 
was in the form of how the channel 
partners could build value on top of 
the Provital solution by combining it 
with their existing business.
Internationalizing
Concurrently, during 2010, the firm began considering making its product and 
business model available internationally. Namely, they focused on the American, 
German, Norwegian, and Swedish markets. In that respect, they collaborated with 
ICI on the market analyses of the German and Californian markets.
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Provital › The partners › Business models › Operations and financing
This meant that each product was 
essentially a copy of the prototype, 
without optimized components or 
processes. Though the manufactur-
ing process was relatively simple, 
the component costs for each unit 
were high.
Furthermore, the installers demand-
ed that Provital provided security 
till the solution was operational. 
This meant that the payment was 
not received until the solution was 
running. This placed a large financial 
burden on the firm’s business model 
as the cash flow was postponed. 
Provital was thus forced to commit a 
relatively large amount of capital for 
extended periods for each sale. This 
strained the firm’s capital significant-
ly. Consequently, the firm was forced 
to seek another round of invest-
ments to maintain the business.
Operations and 
financing
This sales model proved to be the right one for Provital, which, during 2012, 
ensured sound revenue. Yet, a new issue arose, as the firm had not previously 
considered production at the necessary scale. Essentially, the product was not 
optimized for batch production. 
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Provital › The partners › Business models › New investor
By becoming economically inde-
pendent from Kaj Larsen, Provital 
was able to negotiate significantly 
better prices for the manufacturing 
of filters. This provided significant 
savings. Furthermore, the increased 
sales and the presumed future 
growth meant that Provital stood in 
a much stronger position compared 
to their suppliers. This meant that 
they were able to exert significant 
pressure on the price.
New investor
During 2012, the firm managed to attract a new investor. During this, Kaj Larsen 
was bought out of the company, as it sought to end its engagement to release 
capital for its core business. Subsequently, the new investor assumed the role of 
CEO and emphasized driving the international business model. The added capital, 
combined with the renewed focus meant that Provital could focus on building 
lasting relations with installers.
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Summation: The short version
In summary the case followed this pattern
ICI Case Book
Provital › The partners › Summation: The short version
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Focus on lack of resources for upstream activities, including pro-
duction
Business model v. 4 (How to configure production/capital needs)
Focus on lack of resources for downstream activities
Business model v. 3 (utilizing sales partners)
Characterizing the market and its decision makers
Business model v. 2 (influencing decision makers)
Focusing on markets (spa/pool) based on competence/market 
knowledge
Business model v. 1 (direct sales)
Technology exploration/prototypes (exploration of possibilities)
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Provital › The final value proposition
Through the entire process, there 
was a focus on the operations sav-
ings and the space saving enabled 
by the Provital solution. This reduces 
the costs associated with the techni-
cal room, which is often significant 
for new facilities.
 
Provital has also sought to work with 
their value proposition within water 
quality and the associated health 
aspects. Yet, this proved difficult, 
as it is best described as a latent 
need for the end users. Thus, it 
was difficult to activate, as ordinary 
swimming patrons are not aware of 
this. Accordingly, swimming facilities 
do not have any explicit interest in 
improved water quality, as existing 
solutions can fulfill the demands 
placed on them.
The larger development for Provital 
is more related to how their product 
can create value for its partners, 
in the form of the sales channels 
utilized.
The final value 
proposition
The above-mentioned case illustrates how a seemingly clear product innovation 
can change character. The unfolding of a seemingly good product idea can 
thus be very difficult. The value proposition of Provital to its end users was made 
precise during the process.
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Provital › The challenges for Provital’s business model
But the price has been reduced 
subsequently. The primary challenge 
for the value proposition has been 
how to convince customers, buyers, 
and decision makers to purchase a 
Provital solution instead of a tradi-
tional solution. In that respect, the 
uncertainties associated with a new 
product became a central theme for 
Provital’s value proposition. This is 
most likely typical for most prod-
uct innovations, which are radically 
different from the existing market 
offerings.
Accordingly, the challenge has 
been a question of how to market a 
breakthrough product in a business 
that has long been quite conserva-
tive. Namely, this is probably due to 
the large costs associated with such 
facilities. A breakdown in the filtra-
tion system could mean large costs 
through lost revenue and potentially 
a bad reputation for the facility.
In retrospect, earlier on in the 
process, the network should have 
focused on finding a channel or 
partner. This partner should have 
had the necessary will and resourc-
es to promote the Provital solution 
and vouch for the functionality of 
the product. Similarly, this partner 
should be responsible for the op-
erations and maintenance. Prefer-
ably this would be a partner that is 
already known in the business. This 
was partially attempted in Denmark, 
yet the network should probably 
have searched more intensely in 
international markets. Thus, the 
emphasis should have been on how 
such a partner could derive or build 
value on top of the Provital solution 
to ensure the partner’s value appro-
priation.
The challenges for 
Provital’s business model
The case clearly illustrates how even a product with significantly better 
properties than those of its competitors does not guarantee its success. 
Provital has a product, which is, in many ways, superior to competing products on 
the market. From a purely product perspective, the only negative was previously 
the higher initial costs.
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Summary
The purpose of the SAFE network was to revo-
lutionize the transportation business. This was 
to be done by moving freight back on the rail-
way track, thereby creating a much more effi-
cient distribution of freight. In order to fulfill 
this goal, it was necessary to rethink the entire 
freight-handling process. This was aimed at 
removing any excess processes through a com-
plete centralization of freight sorting.
SAFE
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The challenge was for the network to create and design 
a business model that would support the idea, while 
building a business plan for the rollout of the system.
Despite a strong, clear concept, through the sheer 
scale of the concept, the case illustrates the impor-
tance of creating business models in networks. This is 
to share the burden amongst the different actors. Thus, 
the case not only illustrates the difficulties in creating 
a network-based business model, but also the issues 
related to creating a business plan for implementing the 
business model. Thus, the case highlights the need to 
prioritize scarce resources. 
Despite the obvious advantages of the idea, the 
case illustrates the issues related to implementing 
broad-sweeping, structural changes to traditional busi-
nesses. Additionally, the case demonstrates the need to 
couple the technical development with the development 
and design process of a business model. 
In that respect, the aim was to build a completely new system for freight 
transportation. The advantages of the system were thus clear; these 
included cheaper freight rates through less sorting and lower costs per 
mile, reduced load on the road infrastructure, combined with a significant 
reduction in CO2 emissions. 
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SAFE › Introduction
This often involved multiple sortings 
and manual handling of the freight. 
Simultaneously, he saw the oppor-
tunity for moving the freight to the 
railway, as this could provide signifi-
cantly lower prices per mile driven. In 
that respect, the two concepts were 
well aligned, as freighting on the rail-
way required fewer sorting stations, 
as the railway’s advantage was on 
the longer hauls. Lastly, the idea was 
to use trucks for the final stretches to 
the recipient and to the senders.
The central challenge was that 
transferring freight from truck to 
train was very time consuming. 
Thus, he realized a need to devel-
op a technique to quickly transfer 
containers from trucks to trains. It 
would later become evident that this 
technology, though not technically 
advanced, would become one of the 
most central pieces in implementing 
the business model. Thus, the case 
illustrates the importance of creating 
early prototypes, not just to visualize 
the concept internally, but also to 
convince potential customers and 
partners.
At the same time, it was evident th
at to make the central sorting work, 
it would be necessary to create an IT 
infrastructure that could interact with 
the systems of the truck operators. 
This entailed establishing a robust 
system for handling and sorting ship-
ments, which placed demands on 
both hardware and software. Thus, 
the case is best presented as two 
parallel developments. This con-
cerns, on the one hand, the techni-
cal development, and, on the other 
hand, the business model develop-
ment process and its connection 
with the technical development. The 
development of the business model 
will prove to be a central component, 
due to the size and aims of the con-
cept. This required the activation and 
coordination of a series of actors.
Despite a strong concept and a 
well thought-through system mostly 
comprised of surmountable technical 
challenges, the cases will illustrate 
the inertia often existing in estab-
lished businesses. At the same time, 
the case demonstrates the impor-
tance of creating a coherent busi-
ness model early on in the process. 
This is to uncover the interest and 
incentives of the other actors. This 
emphasizes the necessity of demon-
strating the value proposition to cus-
tomers, but equally important is how 
the value proposition can influence 
the customers’ existing business 
models.
Introduction
The underlying concept was conceived in 2003. Heine Blach contemplated 
whether it would be possible to handle the freight distribution more efficiently 
than was possible at the time. 
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This was to create an end-to-end 
system that was significantly more 
efficient than the existing processes. 
Specifically, this was to be config-
ured with railway transportation as 
the central part of the concept.
In the long term, the system was 
to handle all conventional types of 
shipments; namely, parcels, pallets, 
and containers. Later, it would be 
possible to extend the system to 
handle more specialized types of 
freight, for example, oil tanks. Each 
shipment was to be registered and 
scanned at the time of shipment. 
This was to include the recipient 
address, along with the size of the 
shipment for parcels. Thus, the 
system could attach the barcode to 
a specific recipient address at the 
beginning of the process.
The registration of the recipient ad-
dress on shipping was essential to 
the system. This would enable a bet-
ter coordination of the sorting, which 
could subsequently be handled by a 
central freight hub. By knowing the 
recipient addresses from the begin-
ning, it would be possible for an IT 
system to precisely coordinate the 
sorting to achieve maximum utili-
zation of the system capacity. This 
also meant that the shipment would 
only be sorted once, as opposed to 
the traditional scenario where the 
shipments were often sorted 3–4 
times during transit.
After being picked up, the shipments 
would be transported via truck 
containers to a freight station. Here, 
the container would be transferred 
to a train set by the newly developed 
container transfer system (CTS). 
This transfer would only take a cou-
ple of minutes. Subsequently, the 
goods would be transported by train 
to a central sorting depot. Here, all 
the shipments would be sorted ac-
cording to recipient address. Thus, 
all containers would be packaged 
and ready for the last leg of distribu-
tion before being transported to the 
destination. All transport of contain-
ers at the central depot would be 
handled through an automated con-
veyor system. Lastly, the containers 
were to be loaded onto train sets for 
the respective freight stations.
At the freight station, trucks would 
each pick up a container. This was 
to be locked using an electronic 
key to ensure that each driver only 
collected their respective container. 
Subsequently, the shipments were 
to be distributed by truck to the final 
recipients.
The system and its 
advantages
The following describes how the inventor of the concept, Heine Blach, imagined 
the system to be configured and the advantages it would bring. The system was 
to function by changing the traditional service chain on several levels. 
ICI Case Book
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Thus, the system was to be a com-
pletely integrated solution. All pro-
cesses were to be designed so as to 
minimize the number of processes, 
while moving the shipments to the 
railway instead of to trucks.
The advantage was that the system 
would reduce the price of shipping 
significantly. This was done through 
the utilization of the relatively cheap 
railway, combined with a reduction 
in the number of handlings, so that 
shipments were only sorted once. 
Previously, this had not been feasi-
ble, due to the need to use trucks 
for the last leg of the transport. Mov-
ing shipments between transporta-
tion forms was still quite expensive 
and time consuming. Using the 
SAFE concept, the transportation 
time would still remain the same as 
when using truck-based transport, 
yet the big advantage would be the 
price.
The system was to reduce the strain 
on the infrastructure by removing a 
significant percentage of trucks from 
the roads. The use of trains on the 
longer stretches rather than trucks 
would also reduce the CO2 emis-
sions significantly. This reduction 
was further enhanced by a better 
utilization of the available capacity. 
Lastly, the concept also presented a 
series of health and safety aspects 
from the significant reduction in 
handlings and lifts during the entire 
process.
ICI Case Book
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In the long term, the system was to handle all conventional types of 
shipments; namely, parcels, pallets, and containers. Later, it would be 
possible to extend the system to handle more specialized types of freight, 
for example, oil tanks. 
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SAFE › The partners
This provided them with an overview 
of the components needed for the 
system, which was translated into 
the resources and activities that 
were necessary to implement the 
concept. This made it evident which 
competencies were needed in order 
to realize the system.
Blach Holding was Heine Blach’s 
holding company for his businesses. 
Blach Holding acted as the econom-
ic sponsor for the rest of the project. 
Thus, Blach Holding represents the 
core firm and the driving force be-
hind the network. Additionally, it also 
represents a range of competences 
and knowledge within logistics and 
transportation.
SAFE Green Logistic A/S was 
created in October 2011 under 
Blach Holding. This transferred all 
SAFE-related activities to the newly 
founded company. SAFE Green 
Logistic was owned by Blach Hold-
ing, and run in collaboration with 
Andreas Hove Holding. Yet Blach 
Holding was the sole investor in the 
company.
Andreas Hove Holding had pre-
viously worked closely with Blach 
Holding and had previously been 
on the board of directors at Blach 
Holding. Andreas Hove had ex-
tensive previous experience within 
the shipping industry, having had 
several leading positions in larger 
companies. Andreas Hove was hired 
as project manager and coordinator 
for the project.
Fasttrack software supplied the 
software solution to control the sys-
tem, along with the front-end APIs 
for the users of the system to utilize. 
This was to be developed in close 
collaboration with Lyngsø Systems, 
who would handle the hardware 
solutions.
Lyngsø Systems had great compe-
tencies within conveyor systems and 
the general handling of shipments 
from airports and postal facilities. 
These competencies were to be 
used in the handling of containers at 
the system’s central hub. Addition-
ally, Lyngsø Systems had compe-
tencies with RFID chips, which were 
to be used in tracking the individual 
containers. The contact with Lyngsø 
Systems was largely established 
thought SAFE’s participation in the 
ICI project, as SAFE Green Logistic 
had previously attempted to engage 
Lyngsø Systems, yet without suc-
cess.
Alu-Part had the mechanical com-
petence needed to manufacture 
the CTS between trains and trucks. 
Furthermore, an engineering firm 
was hired outside of ICI to handle 
the calculations and fulfillment of the 
demand specifications.
LIVA consult acted as a consultant 
in the creation of applications for 
different types of funding.
The partnership model can gener-
ally be characterized as a supplier 
network, centered on SAFE Green 
Logistic (SAFE). The economic 
means came from Blach Holding, for 
which SAFE purchased the neces-
sary competences, both from the 
ICI partners and other suppliers. As 
such, none of the partners carried 
any economic risk in the project. 
Instead, they would bill all the work 
done on the project. This also meant 
that SAFE maintained the complete 
ownership of all components of the 
system. 
The partners
Preceding the ICI process, there had already been some developments in 
the system: a sorting machine for parcels and an IT system had already 
been created. Yet, a series of components were still missing. To find partners, 
SAFE Green Logistic (SAFE) divided their transportation system into different 
components. 
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SAFE › The business model’s development
The development process for SAFE 
was highly influenced by a strong 
entrepreneurial spirit and desire to 
see the system operational. This 
meant that much of the develop-
ment of different aspects of the 
business model was done in parallel, 
which caused the individual factors 
to influence one another throughout 
the entire process.
SAFE became an official ICI network 
in the middle of 2010. At the time, 
the idea was still very much at the 
conceptual level, as nothing con-
crete had been demonstrated, and 
the software and CTS was under 
development. Additionally, SAFE 
had acquired patents for the CTS 
and the general process of handling 
cargo. In that respect, much of the 
challenge was to create a busi-
ness plan for the progression of the 
concept, along with creating and 
designing a sustainable business 
model. 
Initially, SAFE envisioned an aggres-
sive rollout of the system, which was 
to span all of Europe and later other 
parts of the world. Yet, in the early 
dialogue with ICI and the partners, 
it became clear that this would be 
unrealistic due to the sheer size and 
complexity of the system. Even so, it 
also appeared unattainable for Blach 
Holding to rollout the system in Den-
mark alone, which was the back-
ground for the network perspective. 
Subsequently, the network agreed 
on primarily targeting the Danish 
market. This was to be aimed at 
creating a working demonstration 
of the system to subsequently 
demonstrate the system to potential 
investors and customers.
Simultaneously, the network began 
considering which types of cargo 
the system was to handle. Originally, 
the emphasis had been on parcels, 
pallets, and entire containers. Yet, 
it quickly became clear that espe-
cially parcels would pose significant 
challenges due to the sheer number 
of units. Accordingly, the network 
chose to refocus primarily on pallets 
and containers.
Overall, the challenges in the net-
work can be described on three 
levels. Firstly, there was the techno-
logical challenge in developing the 
competences needed in the system 
in the form of the CTS and the IT 
system. Secondly, the challenge was 
to create a network model, which 
could define and describe the inter-
play amongst many actors. Lastly, 
highly related to the previous point, 
SAFE needed to define its own role 
in the network.
The business model’s 
development
SAFE Green Logistic had not been established as in independent firm at the 
beginning of the ICI network. Yet, this name will still be used to pertain to the work 
done by Heine Blach and Andreas Hove in place of what would later become 
SAFE Green Logistic (SAFE). 
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SAFE › The business model’s development › Technical development
Technical development
Central to the development of the business model was primarily the development 
of the different components needed for the system. These are described 
separately. Characteristic for the development of these was that SAFE carried the 
entire financial risk by exclusively using suppliers.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › Technical development › Container transfer system
Container transfer system
Central to the system was the development of the CTS. This was to enable the 
transfer of a container from the train set to truck within a matter of minutes. This 
was to be done without the use of cranes or the like.
The first step was to draw up the 
required specification for the sys-
tem. This laid the foundation for the 
work to be done. Subsequently, the 
development was handled between 
SAFE, Alu-Part, and an engineering 
firm. The agreement was for SAFE 
to pay for all development done by 
both Alu-Part and the engineering 
firm. In turn, this also meant that 
SAFE would receive complete own-
ership on everything developed.
However, the development of the 
CTS turned out to be more compre-
hensive than originally presumed. 
This, combined with a lack of 
financial resources at SAFE, led to 
multiple delays. Consequently, the 
system was not developed before 
the beginning of 2013, and a proto-
type was still to be made.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › IT system
IT system
Preceding SAFE’s entry into ICI, an IT system had been developed in collaboration 
with Fasttrack software. This was to control the entire SAFE system
Yet, due to other technical challeng-
es, the network chose to suspend 
the development of the software 
system. Namely, it would require a 
larger involvement from the freight 
operators as the software would 
have to be adapted to fit their exist-
ing systems.
The development of the software 
was very cost heavy, and represent-
ed a large share of the total invest-
ment.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › The business model of the network
The business model of the 
network
Though SAFE had chosen to invest in the development of single components, 
it was evident that it would not be able to handle the operations of the entire 
concept. In that respect, it needed other actors to carry out different activities. 
The following describes the dialogue 
that took place with different actors 
and the business model they were 
each presented with. Additionally, 
the contributions of each of the ac-
tors to the conceptual development 
of the concept are highlighted.
In relation to the development of the 
business model of the network, it is 
important to present the pervading 
assumption behind the model. The 
core notion was that existing freight 
operators were to use the system, 
and would thereby become the pri-
mary customers. The development 
of the presentation of the business 
models for individual operations 
components will illustrate the chal-
lenges this notion would present in 
terms of creating a business model 
for the system. 
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SAFE › The business model’s development › The business model of the network › Train operations
Train operations
Early on, it was evident that it was necessary to find an actor that could handle 
the train operations. Consequently, SAFE started a dialogue with a series of actors 
within the business. 
This dialogue brought an improved 
understanding on how trains were 
operated. This proved that each 
train set was able to cover twice the 
number of miles than had originally 
been assumed.
The business model aspect was 
highly similar to the revenue stream 
that the train operators traditionally 
operated under. These operators 
would receive payment for operating 
certain routes. Additionally, SAFE 
did consider a model under which 
the freight operators would pay each 
of the train operators for each con-
tainer transferred on the train set. 
This was very much like the existing 
model of the freight industry, under 
which the freight operators would 
pay a haulage contractor. Yet, a 
dialogue on this model was never 
initiated. Thus, it never became clear 
whether such a model was actually 
possible.
Concurrently, SAFE also procured 
offers on the leasing of train carts 
and containers for the system. This 
was to be done by having a leas-
ing company make the necessary 
investments. Subsequently, another 
actor in the system was to take over 
the leasing. Yet, it did not become 
clear which party should pay the 
lease of the carts and containers. 
However, SAFE had intentions that 
this could be included in the train 
operator’s role.
In relation to the infrastructure, 
SAFE initiated a dialogue with Ba-
nedanmark and DB Schenker. This 
dialogue showed that the existing 
infrastructure was adequate, given 
that the number of train carts was 
reduced. This would allow the freight 
transport to travel at higher speeds, 
thereby following personnel trans-
portation.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › The business model of the network › Main terminal
Main terminal
Central to the realization of the concept was the establishment of a main terminal 
at which the goods could be aggregated and sorted. A possible location was 
found in Fredericia.
This was chosen due to the city’s 
central placement in relation to the 
railway grid. SAFE estimated that 
the investments in the main terminal 
would amount to approximately DKK 
750 million. As such, the figures 
were not validated further.
Yet, SAFE did manage to find a 
Dutch investor who was prepared 
to make the investment. This also 
served to validate the estimates. 
However, this letter of intent was 
laced with strict terms. These 
included that a significant freight op-
erator was to be contractually bound 
to the system. This also demanded 
that the operator would commit to 
a 10-year leasing agreement on the 
terminal. In that respect, the opera-
tor was to handle all operations for 
the terminal. Accordingly, the invest-
ment company was only interested 
in the project given that they were 
guaranteed a return on their invest-
ment over a given time period. This 
then required a significant freight 
operator to commit to the deal.
Additionally, it was not clear whether 
other operators would be allowed 
to purchase access to the terminal. 
And given that they were, it was not 
clear how the agreement was to be 
structured. Thus, there was a signif-
icant risk that the concept would be-
come exclusive to a single operator. 
This would mean that a significant 
number of the concept’s aims would 
not be fulfilled.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › The business model of the network › Freight stations
Freight stations
In relation to the construction of freight stations, SAFE initiated a dialogue with 
Banedanmark. The dialogue centered on using existing freight stations that were 
not currently in use. 
These were available in all the 
relevant cities. In that respect, 
SAFE and Banedanmark estimated 
that the necessary renovation and 
adaption would amount to roughly 
DKK 90 million for all the required 
stations. In that regard, Banedan-
mark was positive, but did not have 
the final mandate to single-handedly 
make these investments. This would 
require political approval, which, in 
turn, would require that the system 
was ready to be implemented. There 
was, however, a strong presumption 
that such a project would be ap-
proved.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › The business model of the network › CO2
CO2
At the same time, the network began investigating the possibilities for 
documenting the environmental savings enabled by the system. This eventuated 
in collaboration with another part of Aalborg University on the creation of a report. 
The report dealt with the system’s 
effect on CO2 emissions by trans-
porting on SAFE rather than trucks. 
The report showed that there were 
significant potential savings. This 
was both due to a much better use 
of capacity, along with the better 
fuel efficiency associated with using 
trains instead of trucks. In reality, 
this report had little value to the 
actors that were to actually use the 
system; namely, the freight opera-
tors. These actors were more inter-
ested in the costs of transportation 
enabled by the system, while poten-
tial CO2 savings were a secondary 
factor. However, the calculations 
could be valuable in relation to work 
with the political system in trying to 
ensure political support. 
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SAFE › The business model’s development › The customers
The customers
As described earlier, SAFE was largely focused on getting large, existing truck-
based freight operators to use the system as customers. In that respect, SAFE 
tried establishing a dialogue with these operators. Yet, the initial dialogue revealed 
that a more tangible presentation was necessary to make any of them interested 
in the concept. 
Thus, at the time, the current in-
terpretation was that it was mainly 
the lack of a CTS that made the 
dialogue difficult. Accordingly, the 
presumption was that given the CTS 
was finished, it would be possible to 
launch the system.
However, it became increasingly 
clear that the existing freight opera-
tors were not necessarily interested 
in the system at all, even though it 
promised cheaper transportation 
costs. On the one hand, operators 
would be forced to make a series of 
investments to realign their busi-
nesses with the SAFE concept. 
Initially, the network believed this 
was only related to direct, one-time 
expenses for adapting trucks and 
so on. Yet, in the dialogue with ICI, 
it became evident that there was 
also a series of indirect investments 
in the form of closing down existing 
terminals and terminating employ-
ees. Thus, it became evident that 
these factors represented a signifi-
cant risk to the existing operations, 
as these all had operational core 
businesses.
Besides the risk associated with the 
system, it became increasingly clear 
that the operators also considered 
SAFE a potential competitor. This 
was far more problematic for the 
concept. This was despite SAFE 
considering itself a future service 
supplier to the operators. Most like-
ly, this was due to the way in which 
the operators’ revenue was struc-
tured. They would generate large 
parts of their revenue on the longer 
routes. Under the SAFE system, a 
large part of these routes would be 
handled by train, which would cause 
the operators to channel revenue to 
SAFE. This would cause the oper-
ators’ to lose a large part of their 
influence on the value chain from 
sender to recipient, which would 
further weaken their position. Addi-
tionally, the system would change 
the entire competitive grounds for 
the business. This was defined by 
the ability to keep trucks full in both 
directions combined with ensuring 
well-placed terminals. With SAFE, 
the terminals would be closed, while 
the utilization of capacity would 
be handled automatically through 
SAFE’s IT system and the transpor-
tation by train. Accordingly, the issue 
at hand was that SAFE attempted 
to make the operators customers 
of its partners. Yet, they saw SAFE 
as a direct assault on their existing 
core business, which they naturally 
sought to avoid supporting.
Concurrently, SAFE also entered into 
a dialogue with other potential part-
ners. Namely, partners who did not 
have freight transportation as their 
core business, but still as a signifi-
cant part of their business. Accord-
ingly, SAFE attempted to establish 
a dialogue with the postal service 
and various supermarket chains, as 
these operated their own distribution 
networks. As such, they stood to 
reap significant savings from using 
the SAFE system. In that regard, 
the issue for SAFE was the lack of 
a finished technology. Furthermore, 
the decision processes in these 
companies were very drawn out and 
difficult to influence. This effect was 
further strengthened as SAFE was 
essentially outside of the compa-
nies’ usual strategic fields. Even 
though the postal service showed 
continued interest, no final decision 
was made.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › SAFE’s business model
SAFE’s business model
The challenge for SAFE was that they had invested significantly in the 
development of different parts of the system. Thus, they needed to find a revenue 
model that could be aligned with the firm’s own visions for its future roles in the 
network. 
A range of possibilities was reviewed 
together with ICI, based on the 
resources available at SAFE. A large 
number of these were quickly reject-
ed. The conclusion was that SAFE 
had no apparent ambition to be part 
of the service chain from sender 
to recipient. This was because the 
company did not have the means 
to make the necessary investments, 
combined with an aversion for hav-
ing to use an outside investor.
The proposed solution was for SAFE 
to generate revenue through their 
IT system and patents. Thus, SAFE 
would be paid for each unit moved 
through the system. In that respect, 
the notion was for the operators to 
pay this fee, either directly to SAFE 
or as part of the payment for using 
the main terminal. Thereby, the rev-
enue was to be implemented in the 
IT system. Yet this could most likely 
easily be copied by others. Conse-
quently, the business model would 
largely be based on the patents for 
the CTS and the general operation 
of the system. Whether this would 
be feasible was not clarified. Yet, 
there were considerations regard-
ing whether SAFE would be able to 
defend the patent, due to its weak 
economic status and the large costs 
associated with defending patents.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › Pilot project
Pilot project
Toward the end of 2012, Kasper Lyhne was hired as project manager, replacing 
Andreas Hove. This brought along a great shift in the approach for rolling out the 
concept. Primarily, this led to significantly more focus on rolling out the concept 
on a smaller scale, as a proof-of-concept. 
The challenge going forward was to 
finish the CTS, as it was a central 
piece of the system, and the lever-
age for customers and users. This is 
expected to be finished during 2013. 
Secondly, the firm has decided to 
initially establish a smaller pilot proj-
ect, which is to focus exclusively on 
moving pallets and containers be-
tween Aalborg and Copenhagen. Ini-
tially, this will only be one train set in 
each direction each day. The sorting 
will subsequently only be handled 
in Aalborg, while the final distribu-
tion will most likely be handled by 
local operators. However, SAFE will 
become the visible party for the end 
customers. SAFE expects to be able 
to lower the freight rates by approx-
imately 20%, while also generating 
significantly higher margins than the 
rest of the industry.
Subsequently, the further develop-
ment of SAFE will largely depend 
on the development within the 
business. SAFE is initially prepared 
to enter into different models of col-
laboration with operators. Yet, this 
will largely depend on whether these 
operators are willing to engage.
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/94
ICI Case Book
SAFE › The business model’s development › SAFE’s business model
SAFE’s business model
The challenge for SAFE was that they had invested significantly in the 
development of different parts of the system. Thus, they needed to find a revenue 
model that could be aligned with the firm’s own visions for its future roles in the 
network. 
A range of possibilities was reviewed 
together with ICI, based on the 
resources available at SAFE. A large 
number of these were quickly reject-
ed. The conclusion was that SAFE 
had no apparent ambition to be part 
of the service chain from sender 
to recipient. This was because the 
company did not have the means 
to make the necessary investments, 
combined with an aversion for hav-
ing to use an outside investor.
The proposed solution was for SAFE 
to generate revenue through their 
IT system and patents. Thus, SAFE 
would be paid for each unit moved 
through the system. In that respect, 
the notion was for the operators to 
pay this fee, either directly to SAFE 
or as part of the payment for using 
the main terminal. Thereby, the rev-
enue was to be implemented in the 
IT system. Yet this could most likely 
easily be copied by others. Conse-
quently, the business model would 
largely be based on the patents for 
the CTS and the general operation 
of the system. Whether this would 
be feasible was not clarified. Yet, 
there were considerations regard-
ing whether SAFE would be able to 
defend the patent, due to its weak 
economic status and the large costs 
associated with defending patents.
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SAFE › The business model’s development › Pilot project
Pilot project
Toward the end of 2012, Kasper Lyhne was hired as project manager, replacing 
Andreas Hove. This brought along a great shift in the approach for rolling out the 
concept. Primarily, this led to significantly more focus on rolling out the concept 
on a smaller scale, as a proof-of-concept. 
The challenge going forward was to 
finish the CTS, as it was a central 
piece of the system, and the lever-
age for customers and users. This is 
expected to be finished during 2013. 
Secondly, the firm has decided to 
initially establish a smaller pilot proj-
ect, which is to focus exclusively on 
moving pallets and containers be-
tween Aalborg and Copenhagen. Ini-
tially, this will only be one train set in 
each direction each day. The sorting 
will subsequently only be handled 
in Aalborg, while the final distribu-
tion will most likely be handled by 
local operators. However, SAFE will 
become the visible party for the end 
customers. SAFE expects to be able 
to lower the freight rates by approx-
imately 20%, while also generating 
significantly higher margins than the 
rest of the industry.
Subsequently, the further develop-
ment of SAFE will largely depend 
on the development within the 
business. SAFE is initially prepared 
to enter into different models of col-
laboration with operators. Yet, this 
will largely depend on whether these 
operators are willing to engage.
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SAFE › Central  challenges
Thus, SAFE should have turned their 
attention earlier on in the process 
to alternative business and network 
models in the search for lead-users 
for the system. Rather than attempt-
ing to collaborate with the potential 
competitors, it would have been 
better to include customers more 
in the development process, rather 
than continuing to develop the CTS, 
software, etc., which may need to 
be changed later anyway.
In terms of the strategic develop-
ment, it has been challenging that 
SAFE took responsibility for so many 
of the investments. This was done 
without a clear plan concerning 
which components were essential-
ly most urgent. Thus, the process 
has been influenced by a lack of a 
clear, thorough business plan. This 
has made SAFE invest significantly 
in different components. However, 
the value of these components for 
the final system is not yet clear. This 
should have led to more focus on 
finishing the CTS prototype and cre-
ating a business model for the sys-
tem. In that respect, the significant 
investments in IT should have been 
postponed. The reason is that these 
probably do not represent significant 
newness and value for the system.
Concurrently, SAFE should have 
sought to involve the right partners 
with a vested interest in the concept. 
Large parts of the process have 
been influenced by SAFE attempt-
ing to negotiate on everybody’s 
behalf, without knowing its own role 
and interest in the system. This is 
very evident in the narrow focus on 
engaging existing freight operators 
to make the system operational. 
SAFE was essentially counting on 
the freight operators to lead the de-
ployment. Lastly, SAFE should have 
focused more on how to structure 
and design its own business model 
before engaging in the development 
of different components. 
Central 
challenges
The central task throughout the process has been to engage the first operators 
for the system to initiate the concept. In that respect, SAFE was faced with 
a significant challenge, as the established industry largely viewed SAFE as a 
competitor. 
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Summary
The Seafood network was founded with the 
aim to create new, innovative business models 
in an otherwise tradition-bound fish business. 
The case illustrates how the business model 
concept can be used. This is not just as an ana-
lytical tool for analyzing a firm or industry.
Seafood
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The Seafood case is particularly interesting as it is the 
only network which was explicitly focused on building 
business models on top of the existing business. The 
other ICI networks mainly dealt with realizing particular 
ideas. In that respect, the case will illustrate how the 
business model concept can be used as a tool to create 
and analyze new business ideas. Additionally, the case 
places a particular focus on the use of the business 
model concept as a guide to match the internal re-
sources and competences with the demands placed by 
particular customer types.
It can also be used as a point of departure to develop new ideas for new 
business models. This also enables the firm to test the new models before 
committing to organizational choices with consequences for the individual 
company.
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Seafood › Introduction
The main customers were restau-
rants and canteens. The founding of 
the firm was carried out by purchas-
ing an existing company in Copen-
hagen Fisketorv to gain access to 
locales and facilities.
Through a previous company, the 
owners were aware of the risks 
associated with being a wholesaler 
and the rate at which success could 
turn into failure in the business. In 
collaboration with ICI, the network 
became aware that is was probably 
a business model challenge, which 
became the starting point for the 
network. The Seafood network was 
established as an ICI project in the 
middle of 2009 to create innovative 
and sustainable business models 
for easily perishable foods. This was 
set against the backdrop of a very 
conservative and tradition-bound 
industry. Specifically, the basic idea 
was to create a business area out-
side of the wholesale business.
Introduction
Copenhagen Seafood was established in 2006. The firm was created as a fish 
wholesaler, with purchase operations in Hanstholm and sales from Copenhagen
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Seafood › The partners
Copenhagen Seafood was the 
instigator and driving force of the 
network. The purpose was for all 
business models to be built around 
Copenhagen Seafood’s existing 
business.
Clips was owned by one of the 
previous owners and founders of 
Copenhagen Seafood. Yet, later 
Clips was bought out of Copenha-
gen Seafood, which made it passive 
in the network.
Poul Kærgaard including the ship 
T300 represented knowledge on the 
fishing and processing of fish, com-
bined with knowledge on the rules 
and regulations which governed the 
fishing industry.
Maskinfabrikken Hillerslev was 
specialized in constructing machin-
ery for the food industry. In that 
respect, it was an available partner 
should there be a need to work with 
new production methods for new 
types of products. However, the 
company became increasingly pas-
sive in the network, which prompt-
ed the involvement of Boatech 
(a firm with similar competences) 
instead. Though the original ideas 
for new methods of production 
were scrapped, the collaboration 
continued outside of ICI. Part of this 
concerned a machine for the better 
exploitation of the total amount of 
meat available on the fish.
Vilsund Muslingefabrik (Vilsund 
Blue) was involved based on an 
idea that Copenhagen Seafood 
was to use its production facilities. 
Additionally, Vilsund had a series of 
competences within production on 
a larger scale. Furthermore, the two 
companies shared a common inter-
est, as both sought to become more 
involved with the actual consumers. 
In that respect, Vilsund Muslinge-
fabrik and Copenhagen Seafood 
worked with similar but not directly 
competing products in the form of 
the oysters and mussels of Vilsund.
Centralrøgeriet was known as one 
of the best smokehouses in Den-
mark. Smoking fish is a method 
of prolonging the shelf life of fish, 
which could open up new busi-
ness models. Later in the process, 
Copenhagen Seafood collaborated 
with Centralrøgeriet in creating the 
company FishFish as a joint ven-
ture, a collaboration that eventually 
failed.
Santrans was thought of as the 
distributor, initially for the idea 
concerning fish mince, but also for 
other business models that were to 
be developed. Copenhagen Seafood 
had through an extended period 
used Santrans as their distributor. 
During the process, the company 
went bankrupt, and in that respect 
had no effect on the network’s de-
velopment.
From the economic perspective, 
Copenhagen Seafood’s accountant 
Revisor Erik Harbo Larsen along 
with Deloitte Financial Advisory 
Services was engaged in the ICI 
project. Both of these actors sought 
to extend their competences within 
working financially with business 
models, which could be done 
through the Seafood network.
The partners
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Seafood › Business model development
Business model 
development
To initiate the process, Copenhagen Seafood carried out an analysis of its 
existing business model in collaboration with ICI. This made it evident that the 
firm was faced with a series of challenges in relation to ensuring a sustainable 
business model.
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Seafood › Business model development › The challenges
The challenges
Characteristic for the fish industry was that it provided very few options for 
product differentiation, as all parties relied on the same types of fish that the sea 
could provide. 
This meant that the network was 
largely concerned with how differ-
entiation was possible in terms of 
other meaningful aspects. This is 
probably typical for all fish wholesal-
ers and, to a large extent, wholesale 
businesses as such. This makes 
the case interesting in relation to 
the possibilities that are available to 
wholesale business in general.
The issue of product differentiation 
was, according to Copenhagen 
Seafood, further emphasized due to 
the lack of quality awareness, from 
customers, as well as consumers, 
merchants, and chefs in restaurants 
and canteens. This led to a heavy 
emphasis on the price rather than 
the quality. This formed a clear idea 
in the firm in which it wanted to 
use its expertise in procuring the 
best goods, which was to become 
a central part of the concept going 
forward.
Within wholesale, the low degree of 
differentiation meant that it was dif-
ficult to retain customers. This was 
due to customers not being loyal 
toward suppliers or wholesalers, but 
rather to the individual sales people. 
If a salesperson switched to another 
supplier, the majority of the custom-
ers would most likely follow.
Lastly, it was paramount that the 
business model was to be designed 
in a manner that could handle the 
easily perishable fish. This placed 
special demands on the value chain 
from catch to the plates of the 
consumers. This was further empha-
sized, as the core firm did not want 
to work with frozen goods. Rather, 
they wanted to deliver fresh fish, as 
it was a significantly better product, 
which would also appeal more to 
the consumer. The above-mentioned 
factors were not new to the firm, but 
the process helped formulate the 
issues that it was facing.
Accordingly, the challenge was to 
rethink the firm’s business model, in 
a manner which would not compro-
mise the existing values. Concur-
rently, any potential initiatives would 
have to avoid negatively impacting 
the existing business. Yet, early on 
in the process, the network realized 
that it should not make any special 
considerations regarding traditional 
fishmongers, as this was believed to 
be a declining market. Accordingly, 
any new potential business models 
would not take them into consider-
ation, even though they were, at the 
time, one of Copenhagen Seafood’s 
customer segments.
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/104
ICI Case Book
Seafood › Business model development › The development process
The development 
process
The development took as its starting point the weaknesses that had previously 
been uncovered. From there, the network worked with a specific business model 
building block at a time during the design process, aimed at creating new ideas 
that could be matured into viable business models. 
For each new idea, a rudimentary 
business model was construct-
ed, which built on the knowledge 
already present. This enabled the 
network to test whether the single 
idea could actually provide the basis 
for a coherent business model.
This proved to be an effective ap-
proach, in that it generated a wide 
range of ideas. Many of these were 
discarded due to the implications 
on the business model as a whole, 
which is also considered a success, 
as the core firm avoided making 
investments which were not thought 
through. Concurrently, there was 
a focus on ensuring that the new 
business models would not nega-
tively impact the existing business 
models. Instead, the aim was to 
find models that could augment the 
existing business by providing some 
synergy with the existing business. 
The core of the development re-
mained centered on how the new 
business models should pertain to 
the sales and distribution on fish 
products of high quality. This was to 
maintain an emphasis on the exist-
ing core competences of Copenha-
gen Seafood.
In that respect, the starting point 
was specifically for Copenhagen 
Seafood to move close to the con-
sumer. Namely, this was aimed at 
making fish more readily available at 
much more attainable price points. 
This entailed the early process being 
largely influenced by attempts to 
reach the supermarkets, as they 
were responsible for a significant 
share of the sales of foods.
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Seafood › Business model development › The ideas in brief
The ideas in brief
The network developed many ideas, of which several were subsequently rejected. 
Yet, it is interesting to present the most prominent ideas, their basis, along with 
their basis and the reasoning for why they did not succeed or why attempts were 
not made to implement them.
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Seafood › Business model development › The ideas in brief › Fish mince
Fish mince
One idea originated from Copenhagen Seafood believing that they had a fish 
mince that the customer preferred compared to that of its competitors. This was 
further backed up by experience with customers. Additionally, fish mince is a 
relatively high-margin product, as it is not exclusively made of fish.
The process started with a brain-
storm with ICI. This resulted in an 
idea to create a vending machine 
for fish mince, for example, to be 
installed in supermarkets. From this, 
the customers could tap into their 
desired amount of fish mince. The 
advantage for Copenhagen Seafood 
was that they would maintain own-
ership of the machines, which would 
ensure their positioning for the 
consumers. Yet, the dialogue with 
the other network partners proved 
the idea to be dead on arrival. This 
was due to sanitary demands, which 
could not easily be fulfilled.
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Seafood › Business model development › The ideas in brief › Gas packaging
Gas packaging
One of the central challenges for the fishing industry is the short shelf life of the 
products. This often leads to large amounts of waste; namely, in supermarkets. 
For this, Copenhagen Seafood found inspiration within other parts of the food 
industry, where, for example, beef is gas packaged, which prolongs the shelf life. 
This led Copenhagen Seafood 
to invest in a gas-packaging fa-
cility, which was to be installed 
at Vilsund Muslingefabrik, as 
they had the required space. 
The purpose was to deliver 
products with a longer shelf life 
to canteens, but also to super-
markets. Subsequently though, 
it turned out that a series of 
other actors had begun doing 
the same thing, which closed 
the market opportunity. Conse-
quently, Copenhagen Seafood 
chose to shut down the project, 
with a significant loss. This was 
largely attributable to the lack of 
preceding analysis of the com-
petitive situation.
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Seafood › Business model development › The ideas in brief › Smoked goods
Smoked goods
Copenhagen Seafood also considered different means of refining the fish. This 
was to open more markets by prolonging the shelf life of the products. Specifically, 
this eventuated in an idea of smoking its fish, which is a well-known method of 
preserving fish. 
Additionally, the firm could create 
extra value for the consumers, while 
also overcoming the issues of shelf 
life. This led the firm to start a joint 
venture with Centralrøgeriet in the 
form of FishFish. This also led to 
the purchase of a smokehouse. Yet, 
the ideas floundered, as the two 
partners could not agree on how the 
collaboration was to be structured 
practically. This meant that the joint 
venture was shut down and the as-
sets shared among the two previous 
partners.
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Seafood › Business model development › The ideas in brief › Tex-mex
Tex-mex
In the network, the partners concluded – based on a conducted survey in the 
market – that the lack of demand for fish was largely attributable to the notion that 
the average consumer did not have the necessary knowledge on how to cook fish. 
This spurred the idea of partner-
ing with, for example, San-
ta-Maria, to make a spice mix 
that was to be packaged with 
the fish. This would provide the 
consumer with all the things 
needed to prepare the fish, 
which would make the cooking 
easy for the consumer. This was 
also well suited for consumers 
who were usually busy. Yet, the 
idea was later scrapped. This 
was due to the size of the con-
cept, as it would have meant 
that Copenhagen Seafood 
would have to have supplied 
an entire chain of stores, which 
would have entailed a signifi-
cantly larger organization and 
production process.
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Seafood › Business model development › Online shopping
Online shopping
The breakthrough in the development of the new business model came while 
describing the firm’s sales and marketing processes. 
This made it evident that the firm 
spent significant time and resourc-
es on servicing existing custom-
ers. This was especially within the 
restaurant segment, as all sales 
were handled through the phone. 
Thus, the basic idea was to create 
a web shop where customers could 
order fish for the next upcoming 
days. This would make it easy for 
Copenhagen Seafood to ensure that 
the site always contained relevant 
products. This could be done by 
adapting the selection based on the 
season and the catch of the day. At 
the same time, the firm could incur 
significant savings, as most of the 
order processing would be handled 
automatically.
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/111
ICI Case Book
Seafood › Business model development › Online shopping › Distribution
Distribution
The initial idea centered on delivering fish in small parcels. This was to be done in 
a way which would not impact the cost side significantly. Yet, this did not seem 
technically possible. Accordingly, a dedicated distribution system was needed. In 
turn, this would mean that delivering to single consumers would drive the price up 
to a level that would make it unattractive.
The solution was to build a con-
cept in which several customer 
orders were delivered to the 
same location. This would lower 
the price of distribution signifi-
cantly. This also meant that the 
business model became much 
akin to the existing wholesale 
model. The main difference 
would be that instead of dealing 
with large clients, the firm would 
deal with several smaller clients, 
who would all receive their 
goods at the same place.
Sales to private consumers also 
had the advantage that all trans-
actions to consumers would be 
paid at the time the order was 
placed. This was contrary to 
larger wholesale clients, who 
would typically demand 60 days 
of credit. Thus, the concept also 
provided Copenhagen Seafood 
with a cash-flow benefit.
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Seafood › Business model development › Online shopping › Sales channels
Sales channels
Subsequently, the challenge was to create a point of entry to the sales and 
distribution. The obvious approach would be to attempt to collaborate with 
supermarkets. 
Yet, this option was forfeited, as the 
scale was deemed too large. The 
firm had at the time realized that it 
was first necessary to test the con-
cept on a smaller scale before they 
could attempt to collaborate with an 
entire chain of stores.
Copenhagen Seafood and ICI con-
sidered a wide range of possibilities 
for distribution. Eventually, the firm 
settled on working through person-
nel associations at larger corpora-
tions. Accordingly, the concept was 
designed so that firms gave their 
employees access to order and pay 
for fish through a login on Copen-
hagen Seafood’s website. Subse-
quently, fish would be delivered 
once or twice per week to the firm’s 
location.
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Seafood › Business model development › Online shopping › Synergies
Synergies
For Copenhagen Seafood, a series of advantages with this model later became 
evident; namely, those related to the use of existing capacity. By delivering to 
corporations, the firm would be able to better use locales and machines. This was 
possible as the wholesale operation usually only worked till around 11 AM, while 
the deliveries to corporate employees would typically be handled in the afternoon.
In total, the firm expected to be able 
to sell the products at a 20% dis-
count compared to supermarkets. 
If the corporations were willing to 
collect the fish at Copenhagen Sea-
food, the discount could approach 
30%.
The positive outlook for the concept 
led the firm to hire a new employee 
in the spring of 2012. This employee 
was to focus exclusively on cultivat-
ing the new market by contacting 
personnel associations at large 
corporations.
However, the largest hindrance has 
been the development of the under-
lying software platform to handle the 
orders. This was meant to integrate 
in the intranets of the corporations 
to ease the process for the con-
sumers. Yet, because the firm had 
chosen to have it developed from 
scratch, the process was very drawn 
out. In that respect, the firm later ac-
knowledged that it would have been 
more prudent to purchase a more 
standard system.
The business model was largely tied 
to the low demand for fish. This is 
evidenced in the notion that the con-
cept would most likely not be sus-
tainable with, for example, beef. This 
would be due to the supermarkets 
already achieving significant econo-
mies of scale on these products.
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Seafood › Business model development › The international perspective
The international 
perspective
As a part of the ICI process, Copenhagen Seafood accompanied ICI to Berlin to 
explore the possibilities in the German market. It became evident that there was a 
market opportunity, as the prices for fish in Germany were equal to or higher than 
those in Denmark. 
Additionally, the distance from Hanstholm to Copenhagen was 
roughly the same as that from Hanstholm to Hamburg. Further-
more, Berlin was also a possibility. Additionally, through ICI, 
collaboration was established with a German University regarding 
a test of the business model in the German market. This further 
strengthened the core firm’s belief in the possibilities in the Ger-
man market.
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Seafood › Business model development › The network approach
The network 
approach
The network around Copenhagen Seafood has been instrumental in relation to the 
knowledge and competences that have been activated. 
These have largely helped shape the firm’s approach to working 
with business models. Additionally, a close collaboration between 
Copenhagen Seafood and Vildsund Muslingefabrik has been es-
tablished. This was based on the notion that Copenhagen Seafood 
could act as a sales channel for Vildsund. This created a benefi-
cial synergy, as Copenhagen Seafood would be able to provide an 
even wider assortment, which made them more attractive to their 
customers.
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Summary
The Space Creator network was created with 
the purpose of improving the utilization of 
space in buildings. The main theme was to al-
ter the common conception of building sizes 
from square meters to cubic meters. The vision 
was to create a purely network-based business 
in which actors with different competences 
gathered to create new, innovative space-sav-
ing solutions.
Space Creator
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The purely network-based approach to business cre-
ation proved to be particularly interesting. On the one 
hand, the case illustrates the basic issues with a purely 
network-based business model approach. On the other 
hand, and in relation to the previous point, the case 
emphasizes the importance of going beyond a purely 
competence-based approach to network creation, to 
also consider risk profile, will, and engagement. 
This was to be done through a combined sales and development platform 
on which private enthusiasts and inventors would be able to present their 
space-saving solutions. Accordingly, the vision was to create a platform 
that provided the companies with a sales channel for their products while 
also accessing valuable inputs from lead-users.
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Space Creator › Introduction
While it had previously focused 
on the stairs themselves as the 
core product, the market analysis 
proved that it had to redefine its 
understanding of the company’s 
purpose. In that respect, it had to 
focus on the value it created through 
the space the stairs gave access 
to. Thereby, the stairs were not the 
real value drivers, but merely acted 
as an agent for providing access to 
something potentially valuable to 
customers.
The other insight from the market 
analysis was that attics were gen-
erally not very popular. This was 
especially evident among women. 
This meant that many people would 
associate the attic space with a 
very low value. This spurred an idea 
to make the attic space valuable 
by focusing more on how such a 
room could be equipped. This was 
essentially the basis for the central 
concept of creating solutions for 
maximizing space utilization for the 
home.
The product development was to be 
highly focused on engaging different 
lead-users within space utilization. 
This carried a special emphasis on 
private people who developed their 
own solutions.
Quickly, Dolle realized that it did not 
possess the competences nec-
essary to transform the ideas into 
products, nor did it wish to acquire 
them. Instead, the company wanted 
to be part of a network of partners 
who could create the solutions. 
Thus, the development could be 
spread out across a series of actors 
with different competences within 
furniture and construction.
Introduction
Previous to the network start, Dolle, the core firm, had made a series of market 
analyses on its ceiling staircases used to provide access to attics. This had 
provided the company with a series of realizations on how its product was really 
positioned. 
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Space Creator › The partners
Dolle was the initiator of the net-
work and the main driver of the 
collaboration. Dolle was primarily 
concerned with producing fold-
ing attic staircases. Yet, later they 
also began manufacturing more 
conventional staircases based on 
customer specifications and based 
on specific parameters. Previous 
to the network, Dolle had realized 
that the market for attic staircases 
was becoming increasingly com-
petitive, which meant decreasing 
prices and margins. Therefore, Dolle 
sought to move the emphasis away 
from delivering access to attics. 
Instead, the network project was to 
help them refocus on utilizing the 
space that the staircases provided 
access to. Throughout the project, 
Dolle was the main coordinator and 
driving force of the network. Simi-
larly, the other partners were found 
and engaged through Dolle’s already 
existing network.
Jeld-Wen produced doors for both 
indoors and outdoors. Thereby, it 
had great expertise within that area. 
Like Dolle, it was faced with its 
product category becoming increas-
ingly competitive on prices and 
margins. In that respect, the network 
was a possibility for the company to 
rethink the way doors were consid-
ered in buildings.
NJA møbler was a traditional fur-
niture manufacturer. It had com-
petences within the manufacturing 
of furniture and the associated 
processing of wood. Like many of 
the other participating firms, it was 
aware of the increasing competition 
in the industry, which, during the 
time the Space Creator network 
was launched, led to the firm going 
bankrupt.
The partners
The starting point for the partnership process was to uncover the competences 
necessary to create new product solutions for maximizing space utilization. 
The process was guided by the assumption that the solutions were to be 
transformable for them to change character according to demand. From this, 
Dolle and ICI initiated a sourcing and competence-screening process.
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Seluxit was specialized in the 
development and production of 
control units for intelligent homes. 
Through this, the network sought to 
be able to offer solutions that could, 
for instance, be controlled using a 
smartphone, while interacting with 
other products. Through the net-
work, Seluxit relished the possibility 
of bringing their products to new 
markets.
Karup Partners delivered furni-
ture, especially focused on futon 
furniture. A part of its portfolio had 
already got built-in space-saving 
elements. Yet, through the network, 
it had the possibility of getting 
completely new perspectives on its 
products and also gaining access to 
a new type of sales channel.
Movetech produced actuators 
and lifting columns, in particular to 
adjustable desks. This was a highly 
mature market with many competi-
tors and a large focus on the price. 
Its expertise within actuators was 
to be used to create transformable 
solutions driven by electrical actu-
ators. In return, the network would 
provide the company access to 
entering a new, potentially interest-
ing market.
Inwido was engaged later in the 
process. The company had com-
petences in producing doors and 
windows. Its engagement was 
largely focused on finding new ways 
of implementing doors and windows 
into the interior of houses.
Tømrerbytømren was a carpenter 
who was specialized in the installa-
tion of kitchens, particularly empha-
sizing customer-specific solutions. 
Like the rest of the construction 
industry, the firm was influenced by 
the financial crisis. For this compa-
ny, the ICI network could provide 
access to new assignments and 
customers. The purpose of its par-
ticipation was for Tømrerbytømren 
to act as an installer of the Space 
Creator solutions, in a similar vein to 
the way kitchen companies operat-
ed.
Boligstil was an interior architect 
firm that became involved in the 
network later in the process. The 
purpose of its engagement was 
for the network to get closer to the 
end consumers to get a better feel 
for the kinds of solutions sought by 
customers.
Previous to the network, Dolle had realized that the market for attic 
staircases was becoming increasingly competitive, which meant decreasing 
prices and margins.
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Space Creator › The business model’s development
Yet, the actual development of the 
network will demonstrate some 
markedly different issues; name-
ly, those concerning the partners’ 
development competences and 
general will to engage in the Space 
Creator concept.
The business model’s 
development
From the outset of the network, the work was clearly defined in relation to setting 
the ground rules between the partners within the Space Creator concept. 
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Space Creator › The business model’s development › The concept
The concept
The Space Creator concept is comparable to the way caravans are furnished. Very 
few square meters contain a wide range of different functionalities. Product wise, 
the idea was for Space Creator to gather inspiration from, for example, the kitchen 
business. 
This was due to these being well 
adapted at delivering complete 
solutions that were highly integrated 
into the housing, which provided 
an optimum utilization of the space 
available. In that respect, Space 
Creator is to be considered a cross 
between furniture and construction, 
which would include furniture with 
different application possibilities 
along with actual modifications to 
the building’s construction.
The Space Creator idea was not 
new as such, as other furniture 
producers were already working at 
making products to utilize hous-
ing space. The difference was that 
Space Creator, to a larger extent, 
wanted to view the housing in its en-
tirety. This was contrasted to focus-
ing on single solutions, for example, 
shelves, by working with complete 
solutions that were more integrated 
into the housing, and which also 
took account of lighting and indoor 
climate. Thus, the purpose was to 
break down the barriers between the 
furniture and the building to create 
better and more relevant solutions.
The basis for the concept is largely 
related to the increasing urbaniza-
tion all over the world. This has led 
to a decrease in available space 
coupled with higher prices. This 
made space more valuable. In that 
respect, the network sought to har-
ness the megatrend within urbaniza-
tion by offering products with a very 
high value to consumers.
Dolle, the core firm, as well as the 
other partners, were largely manu-
facturing firms. This led the network 
to emphasize product inspiration 
as a central challenge early on in 
the process, as none of the firms 
contained these competences. The 
inspiration for the products was 
to largely come from lead-users. 
These were to be engaged through 
a newly created website, on which 
users were able to exchange ideas 
and issues. Thereby, the associated 
firms could draw inspiration from the 
users’ postings, aimed at subse-
quently creating finished products. 
In that respect, the goal for Space 
Creator was to create a common 
innovation project for the partners. 
In this, the individual partners would 
provide their specific competences 
for the relevant product ideas which 
emerged.
Additionally, the notion was for 
Space Creator to act as a common 
front for consumers. This was to 
create a common identity for the 
Space Creator concept and its 
products to strengthen the business 
models for the engaged partners. 
In that respect, the notion was 
that Space Creator was to act as 
a modern private limited company 
with a series of shareholders. The 
shareholders would be the partici-
pating partners, with the possibility 
of extending the concept to more 
partners.
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/123
ICI Case Book
Space Creator › The business model’s development › Ownership
Ownership
As previously mentioned, Space Creator was initially run as a sub-division of 
Dolle. Yet, the notion was for it to act as a private limited company in which all the 
partners would exert some influence on the decisions. Accordingly, Space Creator 
was not to become an independent company, but was to be the manifestation 
of the collaboration between the network partners and the implementation of the 
network’s purpose. 
This construction was built on the 
notion that establishing Space 
Creator as an independent compa-
ny would bring about unnecessary 
costly steps in the value chain for 
the end consumer for Space Cre-
ator to be able to maintain a certain 
margin. By working from the private 
limited notion, Space Creator was 
not tasked with generating a profit. 
Instead, the profits could be distrib-
uted back to the network partners.
From the beginning, the network 
was well segregated, as each part-
ner had an area of expertise that did 
not overlap with the remaining part-
ners. This ensured that each partner 
could provide valuable inputs, while 
also avoiding potential conflicts as 
to which partners should supply 
components for any new solutions. 
Yet, the issue was vested in how 
the partners should distribute the 
profits from any new products, as 
Space Creator was not responsible 
for any production. In that respect, 
the construct lacked clarity in terms 
of which party was to assemble the 
components and, in that respect, 
bear the economic risks associated 
with producing a prototype. Inspi-
ration was sought in the Danish 
co-operative movement used for 
instance within agriculture.
Furthermore, issues arose around 
which partner should gain owner-
ship of any potential new product 
in the form of intellectual property 
rights and so forth. The basic notion 
was that these were to be jointly 
owned, but in reality this was not 
possible. This also brought about 
a series of issues regarding the 
process if one of the partners exited 
the partnership, and regarding who 
had the actual legal ownership of 
the products. Additionally, there 
were potential issues in relation to 
the defense of legal ownership of 
designs against actors outside of 
the network.
The conclusion was that all partners 
were to participate on an equal foot-
ing. All potential ideas and concepts 
brought to the website were to be 
considered freely available for all 
the partners, in that all ideas sub-
mitted to the site would be owned 
by Space Creator. However, it was 
not clear what influence this would 
have on potential users’ willingness 
to submit different proposals to the 
site.
Additionally, unresolved issues 
remained regarding how the network 
should act given the emergence of 
new ideas and products that stood 
to negatively affect other partners by 
undermining their existing business. 
This was brought about by the 
private limited construction of the 
network.
IC
I 
C
as
e 
B
oo
k 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/124
ICI Case Book
Space Creator › The business model’s development › Sales channel
Sales channel
At this point, it was evident that the network had a challenge in gaining access 
to the customers and the market. This was due to the network not having a sales 
channel in the form of a partner or even an agreement with a sales organization. 
Additionally, the Space Creator concept was to be built in a manner that offered a 
sales channel, while also offering a high degree of involvement with the users.
Thus, the network, and mainly Dolle, 
began uncovering different potential 
sales channels. In particular, this led 
to a dialogue with kitchen manufac-
turers, as they already had a similar 
organization. Yet, these manufactur-
ers proved not to be ready to enter 
into a development process.
The conclusion was for Space 
Creator to create a web shop. This 
was mainly done to keep the costs 
down. Additionally, the web shop 
was to contain a community for 
users to encourage customers to 
provide inputs that could be used 
in product development. In that re-
spect, Space Creator developed the 
website from merely being a com-
munity, to also becoming a sales 
channel, which could offer increased 
value for both users and network 
partners.
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Space Creator › The business model’s development › Product development
Product development
Thereby, the basic idea of involving lead-users for inspiration for new products 
was maintained. Yet, the network soon became aware that to engage the lead-
users, it would be necessary to populate the site with relevant, interesting content. 
The original concept had called for 
the development of a community 
that would generate the content it-
self. Yet, the network became aware 
that there was a need for it to create 
some interesting concepts itself to 
start the community. Subsequently, 
it was assumed that the site would 
become self-preserving with new 
ideas and concepts.
This led the network to invest signif-
icant time and resources on hosting 
workshops between the partners of 
the network with ICI as the facilita-
tor. These were aimed at creating 
new products through combining 
the competences already present 
in the network. Initially, most of the 
partners were highly engaged. Yet, 
after a series of workshops with 
many ideas and concepts but no 
actual products, the engagement of 
the partners quickly declined.
The issue was that the involved 
partners, found it difficult to advance 
the prototypes to a level where vol-
ume production was feasible. Even 
when good ideas and big potential 
was present, the need to apply and 
you production set up was difficult 
to accommodate.
Combined with the lack of contact 
with end users, it became evident 
that the network lacked the ability to 
make product development happen 
in relation to integrated solutions. 
This especially emphasized that 
the network partners were more 
accustomed to interacting with 
wholesalers and other producers 
who had the customer contact. 
These would then usually provide 
the partners with the specifications 
for future products. Thus, designing 
completely new types of products 
proved to be a great challenge for 
the network, in particular because it 
was difficult to fit into their existing 
production setups. 
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Space Creator › The business model’s development › Product configurations
Product configurations
In addition to the individual partners’ challenges in relation to scaling and 
controlling a development process, there were also issues concerning how the 
Space Creator concepts were to be transformed into actual products. 
The issue was that the type of prod-
ucts and solutions imagined by the 
network were to be highly integrated 
into the housing. One option was, 
of course, to create custom-made 
components for each customer, yet 
this was outside of the network’s 
ambitions. They rather sought to 
provide solutions based on industri-
ally produced products.
This provided a challenge in defining 
the parameters from which the prod-
ucts could be configured. A good 
comparison is within the kitchen 
industry, where most components 
are delivered in standard measure-
ments, which makes it possible to 
adapt the completed solution to the 
existing building. The issue was that 
the network did not know which 
parameters were to be considered, 
which made it significantly more 
difficult to develop product configu-
rations.
Additionally, the idea of creating 
integrated solutions represented a 
significant challenge on the pro-
duction side, as it placed demands 
on creating flexible industrial pro-
duction that could deliver different 
configurations or adaptions of the 
same basic product.
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Space Creator › The business model’s development › Lowered ambitions/business plan
Lowered ambitions/
business plan
The consequence of the above-mentioned was that Dolle reconsidered the 
construction of Space Creator and the network partners involved. This led to 
a series of conclusions as to the way the business model was structured and 
designed.
First, the purely network-based ap-
proach to the operations and devel-
opment of Space Creator was aban-
doned. This led to Space Creator 
being created as an independent 
firm owned by Dolle. In that respect, 
Space Creator’s purpose remained 
intact, in that going forward it would 
still function as the sales channel 
for Space Creator products, while 
building interaction with users. As 
such, the intention was for Space 
Creator to create a more precise 
profile, with a more clearly defined 
value proposition for manufacturers 
of space-saving products.
Furthermore, a more specific 
business plan for the roll-out of the 
concept was created. Primarily, the 
firm was to be established as a web 
shop for a series of space-saving 
products, not necessarily aimed at 
interior decoration. For example, 
foldable kitchen equipment was em-
phasized. As a consequence of the 
wider assortment of products and 
the potentially vast number of prod-
ucts on the site, the firm realized 
that the handling of the products 
would most likely be very cost inef-
ficient. This spurred a resource-light 
business model under which orders 
would pass through Space Creator, 
only for the individual manufacturers 
to handle the actual shipment to the 
customers. This meant that Space 
Creator would become a showroom 
for products suitable to the concept, 
and would—through building a wide 
range of available products—be-
come a valuable sales channel.
Thus, the entire concept was sim-
plified significantly, in that it would 
primarily focus on stand-alone solu-
tions, whereas the original concept 
had called for integrated solutions. 
This is to be seen as a consequence 
of the complexity involved in making 
integrated solutions for housing. In 
that setting, the interrelation be-
tween the components and configu-
ration possibilities and the individual 
building places great demands on 
the ability to specify solutions that 
contain enough built-in flexibility to 
fit into the individual buildings.
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As such, the business plan is also to 
be considered as an expression of 
the learning that is required regard-
ing how these configurations are to 
be structured. In that respect, the 
integrated-solution goal is still main-
tained. For example, Dolle is now 
working on developing a standard-
ized terrace solution with another 
partner.
On the partner side, the new con-
figuration meant that some of the 
previous partners became superflu-
ous, given that they did not possess 
products that fit the concept. Yet, 
the concept would continue to be 
dependent on partners and suppli-
ers for the site to deliver products 
aligned with the concept, but with 
Space Creator as an actual core firm 
able to control the concept. This 
also led Space Creator to realize 
that in reality the previous partners 
had lacked the necessary compe-
tences to handle product develop-
ment from concept to large-scale 
production, while also lacking the 
will to change their configuration 
to do so. In particular, the ability to 
go from prototyping to production 
ramp up was in high demand. As 
such, Space Creator abandoned 
the idea of working directly with 
partners to develop concepts, and 
instead focused on finding partners 
that already possessed the neces-
sary development capabilities and 
the will to participate actively in the 
network. 
ICI Case Book
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Furthermore, a more specific business plan for the roll-out of the concept 
was created. Primarily, the firm was to be established as a web shop 
for a series of space-saving products, not necessarily aimed at interior 
decoration.
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Summary
The ViewWorld network was created to ease 
the documentation processes for NGOs across 
the globe. This would be accomplished by 
creating a digital reporting system for smart-
phones connected by a back end. This would 
mean significant savings on manual paperwork 
and double entries by automating the process. 
Additionally, the system would reduce the er-
ror margins through built-in check systems.
ViewWorld
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This also highlights how the perception of core compe-
tencies changed, while the understanding of customers 
and the issues they face was significantly more import-
ant. Thus, the case disclose a development in which the 
original emphasis was on the technical capability, but 
how this evolved to be more focused on the ability to 
quickly and effectively create knowledge on the users 
and translate it into product features. This also demon-
strates how the business model evolved accordingly. 
The case illustrates how the original concept evolved into a far greater 
potential than initially assumed and the effect this had on the business 
model design. In that respect, the case will illustrate how the technical 
capability only represents a small part of the whole business model 
configuration. 
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ViewWorld › Introduction
The basic idea was to take the 
experiences derived from digitaliz-
ing public government and create 
similar tools for NGOs. This was to 
create effective solutions for their 
tasks by digitalizing the data-gath-
ering process. This would avoid a 
large number of double entries by 
moving from paper to digital format. 
Additionally, built-in limits for the 
entries could reduce the number of 
incorrect data points. Additionally, 
such a system would also alleviate 
problems of lost paper notes. Lastly, 
the main offices would receive the 
data much faster than previously.
The starting point was to use a 
personal digital assistant (PDA) for 
the data collection. This would have 
custom-made software for the spe-
cific task. Additionally, the system 
would be built upon the existing 
data-collection processes and data 
flows, which would create the foun-
dation for the software.
This led A2I to host a workshop in 
June 2008 consisting of relevant 
companies, the university, and Dan-
ChuchAid. The workshop was aimed 
at uncovering and describing the 
task at hand and the challenges that 
lay ahead. The companies were en-
gaged based on the consideration of 
which competences they possessed 
and products they already made that 
were relevant to solving the issues 
at hand. Specifically, the discussion 
concluded the following points:
- What is the PDA solution to do?
- Which hardware platform should 
the solution be built on?
- What are the required specifica-
tions?
- What kind of data is to be han-
dled?
Initially, there were 12 companies in-
volved. Yet, this number was quickly 
reduced as the purpose of the con-
cept became more clearly defined. 
Ultimately, the network consisted 
of three companies in combination 
with DanChurchAid and the AAU 
institute for E-learning, who would 
jointly handle the tasks. However, 
none of the companies were willing 
to take responsibility for the project, 
which led to A2I assuming the proj-
ect leader role through the company 
InnovationHub. This meant that 
InnovationHub, in collaboration with 
CommunicateIT and DanChurchAid, 
Introduction
The basic idea originated from the A2I collaboration between Aalborg University 
and DanChurchAid’s HMA department during June 2008 (previously mentioned 
in the Eye In the Sky case). In this, Rune Persson participated from HMA, and 
would later be involved in the founding of the ViewWorld firm. 
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became responsible for drafting the 
required specification for the PDA 
units. This led to more features than 
first assumed. Simultaneously, the 
network estimated that the market 
potential was around DKK 36 million 
within humanitarian mine clearing, 
to which DanChurchAid also stat-
ed that the solution could also be 
relevant within other areas, which 
further expanded the market poten-
tial.
Subsequently, the idea was to 
create a standardized product for 
reporting, which could be used 
for a series of purposes with very 
few modifications. At the time, the 
intended business model config-
uration was largely carried by an 
assumption that ICI could support 
large parts of the development and 
thereby reduce the financial risk in 
the development phase. Yet, it be-
came evident that ICI would not be 
able to provide the necessary fund-
ing to carry the project, which meant 
that other approaches had to be 
considered. This led the network to 
seek a written guarantee from Dan-
ChurchAid for the purchase of the 
finished product, which they were 
not able to provide. This is to be 
seen in relation to the then-current 
price estimate for each unit, which 
was around DKK 32,000. Thus, the 
involved companies started to with-
draw from the collaboration. This 
was largely because they had orig-
inally envisioned a network-based 
collaboration in which they could 
maintain their existing business 
models, aimed at customer-specific 
solutions, and with direct payments 
for all work carried out. Thus, none 
of the companies were willing to 
assume the risks associated with 
the project’s business model, which 
was built around commercializing a 
new product.
The breakthrough for the concept 
was when the partners realized 
that PDAs were not necessarily the 
central component. Instead, it was 
possible to use significantly cheaper 
and more easily available smart-
phones for the tasks, as these could 
also be programmed in a similar 
manner to a PDA and contained all 
the necessary hardware functions. 
This made the solution significant-
ly cheaper and more attractive to 
NGOs, but also meant that the 
previous core partner, ProInfo, was 
excluded.
Originally, the idea was for DanChur-
chAid to found the core firm, and 
through this create supplier ar-
rangements with the other partners; 
namely, NetImage as the supplier of 
software. However, DanChurchAid 
was not prepared to take owner-
ship of a commercial project. As a 
consequence, Christian Friis Bach, 
the then-current director of Dan-
ChurchAid, chose to engage his per-
sonal network to rally the investors 
needed to start a company for the 
task. This led to ViewWorld being 
established in the fall of 2010, with 
investors largely representing the in-
terests of NGOs with Rune Persson 
being made project manager in the 
firm, responsible for driving software 
development. Concurrently, the proj-
ect was accepted as an ICI network 
(named after the new entity, View-
World); with the aim that ICI was to 
support the ongoing development of 
the business model for the firm and 
its network.
Subsequently, the idea was to create a 
standardized product for reporting, which could 
be used for a series of purposes with very few 
modifications.
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The product in brief
Through a cloud-based web interface it was to be possible to create different 
data-collection forms, which would subsequently be sent to the individual 
employee’s unit. Subsequently, the individual users would enter data that would 
be transmitted back to the cloud. From there, different presentations of the data 
would be possible.
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › Introduction › The product in brief
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ICI Case Book
ViewWorld  › The partners
ViewWorld was funded as the core 
firm and was responsible for coor-
dinating the activities of the other 
partners, while also translating the 
demands of the NGOs into technical 
specifications. Additionally, it was 
responsible for the commercializa-
tion of the product, initially aimed at 
the NGO segment.
DanChurchAid represented the user 
side of the product and the needs 
it had in relation to the capabilities 
of the system. Through them, Care 
Denmark and the Danish Red 
Cross were also engaged on the 
same grounds. The idea was for 
these partners to use the system, 
both in order to gain knowledge on 
what functionality the system was to 
contain while also building aware-
ness of the product.
NetImage had competences within 
the development of database 
systems and was to be the primary 
software supplier for the back-end 
system.
CommunicateIT was to be in 
charge of creating training manuals 
and e-learning courses for educat-
ing new personnel in the system. 
However, CommunicateIT closed 
down in the spring of 2010 due to 
the financial crisis.
HugeLawn were to be responsible 
for developing the smartphone app 
for the iPhone, which could open 
up new markets and application 
possibilities.
ProInfo was originally thought of 
as the supplier of the PDA units, 
but was made irrelevant due to the 
change to smartphones.
InnovationHub was founded under 
A2I as a temporary core firm that 
was to uncover the possibilities in-
herent in the concept. Following the 
creation of ViewWorld, Innovation-
Hub became superfluous.
The partners
As previously described, the partners were largely involved based on the 
competence identification that preceded the ICI participation.
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ICI Case Book
ViewWorld  › The business model’s development
The case is split into two different 
“versions.” This also indicates the 
versions relating to the software 
development and the pervading un-
derstanding and implementation of 
the firm’s business model. This shift 
was largely due to a new CEO, who 
was hired at the beginning of 2012.
The business model’s 
development
The ViewWorld case is largely centered on a very specific customer need. Yet, 
subsequently, the network worked on defining how the company was to be 
structured to accommodate this need. Thus, the case will illustrate the problem 
that can emerge when customers become too closely involved in the business’ 
development. 
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Version 1
This section will lay out the development of the business model in the first stage of 
the company’s lifetime and the considerations behind this.
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 1
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The network model
Based on the firm’s establishment through the A2I network, the original business 
model for ViewWorld was for it to act as the NGO’s firm in the network. This is very 
evident from the personnel in ViewWorld, in the form of Rune Persson, who had 
previously worked in NGOs, and Christian Friis Bach, who became CEO and in 
charge of sales.
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 1 › The network model
Accordingly, ViewWorld’s core task 
was to interpret the needs of the 
NGOs through close collaboration 
and by using the personnel’s per-
sonal experiences within the field. 
Additionally, NetImage was the 
supplier while ViewWorld was the 
project leader for the actual devel-
opment. Furthermore, ViewWorld 
was responsible for the sale of 
the finished product. The primary 
focus was to first sell to Danish 
NGOs through Christian Friis Bach’s 
network, and through these, also 
to build contacts to departments in 
other countries.
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The development process
Accordingly, the purpose of the firm was not for it to be a development firm. 
Rather, it was to supervise and finance the development undertaken by NetImage. 
At the time, the business plan was built around creating strategic collaborations 
with NGOs that would pay for a custom product. 
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 1 › The development process
In that respect, ViewWorld sought 
to control the development in such 
a manner that the work that went 
into the custom solutions would 
also be applicable to a broader 
turn-key solution. As such, the plan 
was to develop a product through 
NetImage, which could be sold 
as a finished package, yet receive 
some funds through the revenue 
generated from the NGOs. Thus, the 
essence was to be able to create a 
standardized platform that could be 
sold to other customers with rela-
tively few adaptions.
Initially, this was done in collabora-
tion with CARE DanChurchAid, the 
Red Cross, and Beredskabsforbun-
det, who were the primary cus-
tomers. Accordingly, the work on 
defining the content of the product 
was largely aimed at fulfilling their 
specific needs. In that process, it 
became evident that mine clearing 
was no longer relevant due to the 
technical challenges posed by the 
legislation within the field. Yet, there 
remained a significant potential with-
in a series of other application pos-
sibilities within the NGO segment.
The issue arose in part as a con-
sequence of the constantly evolv-
ing demands of the customers. 
However, this was intentional, as 
the purpose was to uncover which 
functionality was to be integrated 
into the system. Yet, combined with 
ViewWorld’s own idea generation, 
the number of features rose signifi-
cantly, which the firm was essentially 
not suited to handle. The conse-
quence was that the firm lost its 
overview. Combined with tight dead-
lines and lack of capital, this meant 
that the features requested by the 
customers were coded as a specific 
feature to the customer. As such, the 
individual features were not coded 
in a manner that would be usable 
to other customers. In part, this 
was most likely due to the lack of 
experience of the project manager, 
but was also due to the fact that the 
firm’s owner’s interests were mainly 
centered on NGOs.
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Insourcing
It became evident that the collaboration with NetImage was very costly, as the 
pricing was based strictly on commercial terms. Furthermore, and even more 
importantly, the demands for the software were not very well defined. 
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 1 › Insourcing
This was due to the development 
taking place in such close collab-
oration with the customers, whose 
demands changed as new possi-
bilities became visible to the cus-
tomers. Consequently, ViewWorld 
chose to shut down the collabo-
ration with NetImage to hire pro-
gramming resources internally. This 
provided the firm with a significantly 
more flexible development process 
that could quickly be adapted to 
customer needs. This also meant 
that ViewWorld became a software 
development firm, who was itself 
responsible for the development 
process, whereas it had previously 
just focused on specification and 
sales.
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Pricing
The revenue stream of the firm was often difficult to pinpoint as there were several 
conflicting interests involved.
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 1 › Pricing
Originally, the firm had envisioned a 
model similar to that used on ERP 
systems and on similar systems 
under which customers pay for 
individual modules or for specific 
functionality. Accordingly, the notion 
was that the customers would pay 
a fixed amount for, for example, a 
module for photo documentation. 
Additionally, it was to be possible 
for customers to purchase specif-
ic adaptions beyond the modules 
available, to which they would pay 
hourly rates for the development. 
The issue of this model was that 
ViewWorld had costs associated 
with hosting, which would scale up 
and down based on the number of 
users. This prompted the firm to 
think more in terms of subscription 
solutions to ensure that the revenue 
was more aligned with the firm’s 
cost structure.
Additionally, the firm’s starting point 
was still the NGO segment, who 
wanted to use the solution as much 
as possible to simplify their work. 
Accordingly, the firm settled on a 
two-part revenue model. This would 
have a small and a pro edition of the 
solution, under which the pro edition 
would provide access to more 
users, more server space, and more 
forms of data entry, along with more 
advanced features.
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Market segments
As described previously, at this time, ViewWorld was mainly targeting the NGO 
segment, due to its experience and contacts within the field. Yet, the work with ICI 
had built a certain understanding that the product also had potential application 
possibilities within other segments. This was primarily aimed at CSR reporting and 
journalists, as these have a certain relation to the NGO segment.
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 1 › Market segments
ViewWorld even attempted to target 
segments other than NGOs, when it 
sold the solution to Beredskabsfor-
bundet. Yet, this proved highly 
problematic, as the deal entailed a 
series of customer-specific adapta-
tions of the solution, which ended 
up consuming much of the firm’s al-
ready limited development capacity. 
Overall, this is a telling description of 
the firm during the first stage, as a 
disproportionate amount of time was 
spent on creating customer-specific 
solutions. This consumed much de-
velopment time and was finally not 
profitable, as they were essentially 
development projects. Additionally, 
the firm lacked the necessary over-
view needed to control the develop-
ment of the system toward a more 
broadly applicable solution. It would 
have been good to spend more time 
on the selection of customer seg-
ments.
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Version 2
At the beginning of 2012, the firm hired a new professional CEO named Uffe 
Hyldgaard, as Christian Friis Bach, due to his political work, would no longer be 
able to manage his CEO assignments. The starting point was for Uffe Hyldgaard 
to open up a series of new markets through his knowledge of sales to industrial 
actors. Yet, he was to maintain an emphasis on the NGO segment as the primary 
market. This gave the new CEO the chance to reconsider the entire company and 
the way the company was to be operated in going forward. This led to a series of 
changes in the way the firm was operated. However, at this stage, it is important 
to highlight that version 2.0 of the software was not finished, at the time. As such, 
it is important to state that the depiction in the following is merely a picture of how 
the business was planned to be implemented.
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 2
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Outsourcing
Primarily, the purpose of the firm was redefined from being a development firm to 
a knowledge firm. Thus, the firm was to sustain itself via its general knowledge on 
reporting needs, whereas it had previously emphasized its knowledge of a specific 
segment’s needs. 
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 2 › Outsourcing
This is to be viewed in relation to 
the fact that ViewWorld had often 
functioned as a consultant for its 
customers by presenting the possi-
bilities inherent in the software. The 
new model was more focused on a 
new pricing and marketing structure, 
aimed at engaging customers to try 
the product.
Additionally, the firm was to trans-
late its knowledge into specifica-
tions, which would be handed to 
an external developer situated in 
Poland. This meant that the devel-
opment work was outsourced. In 
that respect, the firm reckoned that 
it had acquired the needed project 
management competence through 
the attempts to develop products 
internally. The company therefore 
felt mature enough to outsource the 
development. The choice of a Polish 
supplier was largely brought about 
by the price, but also because View-
World, through its network, had had 
previous interaction with the devel-
oper. This provided a certain degree 
of trust in their abilities. Additionally, 
the developer had the necessary 
size and breadth of competences 
needed to handle the entire solution. 
Additionally, they were also able 
to scale the rate of development 
significantly, which had not been 
possible internally.
The difference from the original de-
velopment model with NetImage as 
supplier was largely that ViewWorld 
had acquired a range of project 
management competences. This 
enabled ViewWorld to effectively 
work with such a supplier. This came 
in part from the experience they had 
gained, but also, to a large extent, 
from Uffe Hyldgaards previous expe-
rience as an IT project manager.
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The development process
The existing core customer, DanChurchAid, CARE, and the Red Cross, remained 
partners and were frequently used for inputs on which functionality was to be 
implemented in the software. 
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 2 › The development process
However, the difference from the 
previous scenario was that the firm 
held a much more stringent attitude 
regarding which features were to 
be implemented for the customers. 
As such, the firm managed to move 
beyond the role of a developer to-
ward delivering a more standardized 
product. The previous compromise 
of implementing customer-specific 
solutions was therefore abandoned. 
Yet, the firm would still use the cus-
tomers’ inputs in their assessments 
of which features would be relevant 
to implement. Custom functionality 
was still possible, but would entail 
that the customers paid the full price 
for all development. In that respect, 
the customers were better sepa-
rated from the development work, 
which enabled ViewWorld to create 
a clear vision of what aims should 
become priorities. 
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Pricing
Furthermore, the firm began to work on a more clearly defined pricing structure, 
which was to be better aligned with the customers’ use of the software. The main 
issue was that customers would often try to negotiate the price, as they would 
rarely use all the features that were available to them. 
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 2 › Pricing
Rather than offering standard 
packages to the customers, the firm 
would go on to create a scalable 
solution, for which customers paid 
according to how much they used 
the solution. Additionally, the firm 
created a freemium model, aimed at 
luring potential customers to try the 
solution before purchase. This was 
combined with the firm giving up 
its previously targeted direct sales 
effort toward certain segments. This 
freemium model was limited to two 
users and a limited amount of data 
storage.
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Marketing
Lastly, the firm employed a clearer marketing strategy. Previously, it had focused 
on solicitation based on customers’ reporting needs. 
ICI Case Book
ViewWorld › The business model’s development › Version 2 › Marketing
The new strategy entailed a purely 
web-based firm, where custom-
ers purchased the product online 
through a simple sales process. In 
that respect, the freemium model 
was an important aspect to ensure 
that customers would begin to ex-
plore the possibilities of the product 
themselves. Additionally, the firm 
would employ a different form of 
Internet-based marketing; namely, 
search engine optimization and ban-
ner ads on relevant websites.
The original challenge was that the 
customers were not typically aware 
of why they should use the software. 
The freemium model was to give 
them a free incentive to explore the 
possibilities for themselves without 
ViewWorld’s involvement. In that re-
spect, the previous software solution 
had not been user-friendly enough 
for the customers to explore the 
software themselves, as the set-up 
had been particularly complicated. 
Thus, the freemium model combined 
with the updated focus on the soft-
ware and its usability became the 
cornerstones of the new business 
model.
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Summing up
The pivotal point for the business model de-
velopment in this case was in the firm moving 
away from considering itself as a supplier to 
NGOs to seeing itself as a supplier of gener-
al solutions for data collection. Thus, the firm 
moved its focus away from the deep knowledge 
on NGO documentation processes toward fo-
cusing on its general competences within data 
collection.
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The external developer made it possible to actually 
develop the software with these characteristics, as the 
company also had the required competences within us-
ability design and so on. Thus, version 2.0 covers both 
the software development, with an increased emphasis 
on a finished solution that can be sold without adapta-
tions from ViewWorld, along with the firm’s own change 
in perception regarding its own role. In that respect, 
is has been a challenge for the firm to reach the stage 
where they are actually able to deliver a standardized 
solution that does not need further adaptions.
Thus, the current business model is very like the one 
that was originally envisioned. The essential difference 
is that the firm has the competences needed to control 
these processes in a manner in which the individual 
customers control the development of the software. 
Furthermore, the key supplier has been exchanged with 
one that is more relevant with broader competences. 
Lastly, clear boarders have been established for the 
collaboration with the customers. 
This would most likely not have been possible without 
the new CEO. He managed to create the space needed 
to gain oversight in terms of the development and to 
specify the future plans of the firm. The issue was large-
ly related to an explicit wish to have a self-financed firm, 
which, as we know, did not succeed. By demanding 
the necessary space from both customers and owners, 
it became possible to focus on fulfilling the business 
model and stringently follow the premises on which that 
model was configured.
This also entailed letting customers figure out how they wanted to 
configure their digital-documentation flow themselves. Thus, the business 
model design was largely dependent on the development of version 2.0 of 
the software. This was to make the schema set-up significantly easier for 
non-IT-proficient users, which was the key to enabling the purely Internet-
based sales.
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